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BANKRUPTCY FORUM

Constitutional Chaos:
Rodrock v. Security Industrial Bank
Thorp Finance Corporation v. Gifford
RICHARD L. MERRICK*
"Safeguards were provided to protect the rights of secured creditors ... to
the extent of the value of theirproperty.... There is no constitutionalclaim to
more than that."'
Justice William 0. Douglas
"An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value . . . and is an unsecured claim to the
extent that the value . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim.",

Bankruptcy Code, § 506(a)

For much of this century a broad segment of lawyers, scholars
and judges conversant with bankruptcy law has believed that the
analysis expressed above represented the extent of a secured interest in property for bankruptcy purposes. Since 1940, that view has
become virtually unanimous. More importantly, that concept is the
foundation upon which the entire Bankruptcy Code is constructed;
the pattern of the Code is to allow that much to a secured creditor
and no more.
It is implied in Rodrock v. Security Industrial Banks and expressed in Gifford v. Thorp Finance Corporation' that a secured
creditor is entitled to more than the value of the collateral: it has
* Judge, United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. B.A., Yale University, 1940; LL.B., Harvard Law School, 1943. Judge
Merrick is president-elect of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.
Sincere thanks are offered to the University of Chicago Law School for permitting the use of its library, to Mrs. Patricia A. Hurley for translating the hieroglyphics in which the manuscript was delivered, and to Richard S. Lauter for his
assistance in checking citations, editing and proofreading.
1. Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278 (1940).
2. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549, 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (Supp. IV 1980) [hereinafter cited as "Bankruptcy Code"].
3. 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), prob. juris. noted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S.
Dec. 14, 1981) (No. 81-184).
4. 669 F.2d 468 (7th Cir. 1982) rev'd en banc, no. 81-1174, slip op. (7th Cir.
Aug. 18, 1982).
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"a property right. . . of value regardless of the worth of the object
in which it is held . . . ."5 Gifford does not rely upon a Supreme
Court decision on which to base its revolutionary doctrine, but
rather on a Colorado bankruptcy court decisionO which analyzed
the implementation of section 522(f)(2)(A)l of the Bankruptcy
Code as though it were an exercise of the right of eminent domain.
If Rodrock and Gifford are correct, then several hundred thousand
bankruptcy proceedings decided since the fall of 1979 involving secured creditors have been wrong, and no proceeding presently
pending respecting secured property can be counted on to conclude
successfully. If the secured creditors are entitled to value plus,
they will not settle for value alone.
There is no indication that the court in either Rodrock or Gifford intended the influence of its decision to extend beyond the
rights of a creditor holding a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interest in household goods. The scope of a security interest under section 522(f), however, is the same as it is under section
506(d) respecting the disallowance of a lien without value to support it, or under section 722 respecting the redemption of property
subject to a lien, or under section 1129 respecting the amount re5. Id. at 473.
6. Rodrock v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 3 Bankr. 629 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980).
7. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(A) reads in pertinent part:
(f) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the
fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that
such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been
entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel,
appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry
that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of
the debtor or a dependent of the debtor....
8. E.g., Stump v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 8 Bankr. 516 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1981);
Campbell v. Avco Fin. Services, 8 Bankr. 425 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); Pillow v.
Avco Fin. Services, 8 Bankr. 404 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981); Sweeney v. Pacific Fin.
Co., 7 Bankr. 814 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1980); Joyner v. Golden Dome Inv. Co., 7
Bankr. 596 (M.D. Ga. 1980); Brown v. Termplan, 7 Bankr. 264 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.

1980).

See also Comment, Constitutionality of Retroactive Lien Avoidance Under

Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f), 94 HAuv. L. REv. 1616 (1981)[hereinafter cited
as Harvard Comment]; Comment, Lien Avoidance Under Section 522(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code: Is Retroactive Application Constitutional? 49 FORDHAM L.
REv. 615 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Fordham Comment].

[1982:167]

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS

quired to be paid to a dissenting secured creditor, or under section
1328 respecting the discharge of a debtor with regular income. The
Bankruptcy Code has an integrated structure, and the basics are
the same whether the case at issue is filed under chapter 7, chapter
11 or chapter 13. There is no logical reason to apply a plus value to
a security interest under section 522 and not to apply a plus value
as well to any of the other sections defining the rights of secured
creditors. If section 522 cannot be applied retrospectively, then
other sections defining the rights of secured creditors cannot be
applied retrospectively either.
Much of the division of opinion respecting the constitutionality of section 522(0 appears to result from the different major
premises upon which the conclusions are based. For example, a recent law review note hinges on the following reasoning: "Since the
creditor whose lien is avoided will only rarely receive the value of
his collateral as an unsecured claimant, it would seem to follow
that retrospective application of the statute is unconstitutional."'
The assumption of the article is that the property has some value
which will not be recovered by the creditor, also the assumption of
Rodrock. The assumption is incorrect. The collateral has little or
no value to the creditor, and there is a legislative presumption to
that effect. 10 If the courts will take the commercial value " of the
9. Harvard Comment, supra note 8, at 1624.
10. "[The items have little if any realizable market value." H.R. REP. No.

595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1977).

11. Market value means value at the market place, and the way in which this

can be determined is by getting the property to the market place, or by cidculating the cost of doing so. The expense of getting the item there appropriately
should be deducted from what it would have brought at its initial location. Thus

market value is the same as commercial value.

The value should be the value to the secured creditor because it is he who is
contending that he has been deprived of something of value. The value to him is

what he might receive after a sale in a manner prescribed by local law, less
whatever were his costs of collection and costs of preparing the merchandise for
sale. As stated in the Commission Report: "The most appropriate standard is the
net amount the creditor would receive were he to repossess the collateral and
dispose of it as permitted by the applicable nonbankruptcy law." REP. OF THE
COMM. ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93rd

Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (Part I, Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter referred to as the
COMMISSION REPORT].

Another commentator demonstrates the distance between ivory towers and
the real world- As a hypothetical set of facts (which is the basis for the reasoning
of the entire article) the values for several household appliances, ascertained at
the time of making the secured loan one and one-half years previously were: stove
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collateral, that is, the initial fair value at the residence of the
debtor, less cost of repossession and sale, they will find no value
ninety-nine times out of one hundred and little value the remainder of the time. If the value of the collateral is zero, the creditor is
entitled to zero.
If Rodrock and Gifford had applied the law which existed at
the time that the appeals were perfected, they would have remanded the proceedings to the bankruptcy courts to determine the
commercial value of the collateral, with directions to void the lien
if the value was zero. But, rather than following established precedent, Gifford indicates that value is not a determinant and that a
right exists even where there is no value. "The fact that the value
of § 522(f)(2) items may be less than the debt they secure does not
make the security interest worthless . ... ,, Nobody ever contended that it did. What makes the security interest worthless is
that the security is worthless.
Rather than jumping into the middle of a complex constitutional dispute, an understanding of that issue appears more likely
to result from first examining the historical background of bankruptcy law in order to gain a broader perspective and then returning to Rodrock and Gifford when the panorama has been completed. Illustrated throughout the historical materials, and of
particular importance in determining any current bankruptcy
problem, is establishing whether the point of confrontation is
among creditors or between a debtor and creditor. Different principles apply but frequently are disregarded because the analyst is
not aware that current bankruptcy law has two nuclei. The writer
knows 'of only one reported opinion ' 8 respecting the constitutionality of section 522(f)(2)(A) which has taken cognizance of the bipolar nature of bankruptcy law;14 consequently, some of the deci$200, refrigerator $250 and washer $150. Assuming an average age of two and onehalf years, these figures are extremely high and completely out of line as commercial values and, for that reason, tilt the reasoning process of the author in the
direction of believing that the secured creditor is being deprived of something of
true worth. See Comment, Section 522(f) of the 1978 Code-Constitutionalityof
Its Application to Security Interests Pre-dating Enactment of the Code, 27
WAYNE L. REv. 1281 (1981). Cf. Fordham Comment, supra note 8.
12. 669 F.2d at 473.
13. In re Morris, 12 Bankr. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981).
14. As used in this article "bankruptcy act" will have the meaning which it
had in England and in the colonies at the time of independence, and that is, a
statute the primary purpose of which is to provide for the equitable distribution
of a debtor's assets among his multiple creditors. "Insolvency act" will be used in
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sions which have arrived at the correct conclusion have done so
there for the wrong reasons. It is as if three left turns had been
taken instead of one right turn.
BACKGROUND OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

Legislation does not originate in a vacuum but is the consequence of social, economic and political forces combining to produce a change. Lord Coke enunciated what continues to be the
most incisive diagnostic approach to defining the purpose of legislation in his report of Heydon's Case.1 6 Coke's analysis consists of
four steps:
1st. What was the common law before the making of the act.
2nd. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law
did not provide.
3rd. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to
cure the disease of the commonwealth.
and 4th. The true reason of the remedy .... 6
This article will use Coke's four step approach to analyze:
17
(a) the first bankruptcy act,

(b) the two Frazier-Lemke Acts,18 and
(c) the Bankruptcy Code, section 522(f)(2)(A).
To a lesser degree, Coke's analysis will be utilized to probe into the
intent of the Constitutional Convention in granting bankruptcy
powers to the Congress but not prohibiting those powers to the
States.
To describe the court system in 154219 in a meaningful way, it
the same historical sense as being a statute, the primary purpose of which is to
permit a debtor to be free of debtors prison, whether to be released if already
there or to avoid imprisonment in the future.
15. 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584). See generally D. HuME, HISTORY OF ENGLAND

(1864); J. FROUDE,

HISTORY OF ENGLAND

(1870).

16. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584).
17. See infra note 46(a).
18. Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934, ch. 869, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat. 1289,
adding subsection (s) to § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as amended, adopted
June 28, 1934); Frazier-Lemke Act of 1935, ch. 792, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49 Stat.
492, adding subsection (s) to § 75 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1898, as amended,
adopted August 28, 1935).
19. The first bankruptcy act granted power to administer over offenders to
the King's top officials. These were the Lord Chancellor, Keeper of the Privy Seal,
the Lord Treasurer, the Lord President, the Lord Privy Seal, other members of
the Privy Council, the Chief Justice of the Common Bench, and the Chief Justice
of the King's Bench, or at least any three of them.
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is necessary to go back to the time of Henry II, who, in 1176, provided for an institutionalized court system consisting of six circuits
of three judges each, whose work was essentially judicial but was
also administrative. During the reign of Edward I (1272-1307), a
more definitive structure was established which continued in substantially the same form until the nineteenth century. On the law
side the judiciary was divorced from administration and sat either
as the Court of Common Bench (Common Pleas) to hear disputes
between subjects of the Crown, or the Court of King's Bench,
which heard disputes by or against the Crown and appeals from
the Court of Common Pleas. These were courts of record, presided
over by judges, assisted by a permanent staff.20 The vast bulk of
settling of disputes, however, was conducted in popular courts presided over by laymen without the benefit of judicial or statutory
guidelines, professional counsel, written pleadings or written
precedent. 1
20. Other institutional courts were Ecclesiastical Courts run by the Church,
with jurisdiction over domestic relations, usury, and matters affecting the
Church's land or its tenants. In addition, the Court of the Chancellor was beginning to develop a juridical importance while the Court of the Exchequer was
switching from judicial to fiscal activities. See generally T. PLUNKETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw (1956); A. CATuR, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH COURTS

(1914).
21. Three popular courts of limited significance were Manorial Courts, Forest
Courts and Hundred Courts. A lord of a manor might establish a formal structure
to settle disputes within his manor. Forest Courts were an outgrowth of the concept that, by and large, the forests were the property of the Crown. Red deer,
fallow deer, roe and wild boar, collectively referred to as venison, were beasts of
the forest, which could not be killed without permission of the Crown, nor could
trees be cut. There were three types of Forest Courts which supervised a loose
authority over the forests, but the only one which had regular sessions did not
have jurisdiction over wild' game.
A Hundred was both a geographical and governmental entity comprised of
roughly 100 families which had its own simple civil administration, including a
Hundred Court presided over by one of the members elected by the group. Because of the size of the counties it might be presumed that county courts would
have played an important role in civil judicial administration, but the great distances and lack of roads caused the county seats to be inaccessible. County court
functions were exercised largely by the piepowder courts, discussed infra, or by
the King's Courts-King's Bench and Common Pleas. The last two may be compared to the federal court system in the United States, in the sense that they were
a professional judicial system exercising a uniform set of laws and procedures,
with direction from a central source. The Common Bench sat at Westminster; the
King's Bench rode circuit.
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Piepowder Courts
The generic name used to describe the local summary jurisdiction courts is "Piepowder Courts," derived from pieds poudreaux
because of the dusty feet of the itinerant merchants who attended
them. The operation and jurisdiction of piepowder courts is not
significant to bankruptcy law except that bankruptcy is a function
of commercial law, which was administered in the piepowder court
throughout the development of English law that preceded American independence (and for one hundred years afterward), except
that as time passed:
(a) bankruptcy itself was transferred to the King's Courts
in 1542;
(b) merchants' customs and usages became recognized in
Chancery;
(c) merchants' customs and usages became a part of the
general law through statutory adoption and court decision;
and
(d) many customs and usages came to be included (with the
advance in literacy) in the terms of written contracts.
The piepowder courts consisted of Fair Courts and Staple
Courts which were essentially mercantile courts and Tolsey
Courts' 2 which administered the Law Merchant but did not confine themselves to mercantile matters. None of these courts had a
judge as a presiding officer; none of them was required to keep
records of the proceedings; none of them required written pleadings; and none of them required representation by an attorney. A
defendant usually had no more than one day nor less than one
hour in which to answer a complaint. In some of the courts a deci22. See 23

PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SOCIETY

THE SELDEN SOCIETY

(1930), 49

(1908), 46

PUBLICATIONS OF

PUBLICATIONS OF THE SELDEN SocIEr

(1932).

Written pleadings and judgments frequently were used and recorded, and
many are preserved in court rolls, but with so many codes, symbols, and abbreviations that they are legible only to a scholar of the period. Although many of the
records state that the cases turned on local custom and usage, they do not describe what the customs and usages were.
In the Ludlow Tolsey Court in an action to recover a meal sack, it was shown
that by custom the millers delivered the meal in the same sack in which they had
received the corn. ("Corn" is used generally in England for "grain.") The contract
in question was merely for grinding the corn, and at common law no reference
would have been admitted respecting a custom about sacks. Similarly, the court
rolls of St. Ives reveal a rent case in which the tenant was able to show that by
custom one-third of the rent was payable in corn; similarly at Winchester, that
one-third of the rent was payable in wheat and malt.
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sion had to be reached before the third tide. Piepowder courts continued in London until 1854 and elsewhere until 1898.
In medieval England a market was the focal point of commerce. The right to grant a market was a royal prerogative or
franchise, and from the time of William the Conqueror towns,
lords or abbots were granted the privilege of holding fairs, usually
lasting from two to four weeks. Frequently before, and almost universally after the time of Henry 11 (1154-1189), the right to hold
courts during the fairs also was given. The purpose of a Fair Court
was to settle disputes arising among merchants as a result of the
fair. Originally, the jurisdiction of the Fair Courts was limited to
the duration of the fair, but later it was extended to allow the settlement after the conclusion of the fair of disputes which had
arisen during its operation. Several statutes were passed to assure
that the Fair Courts did not exceed their jurisdiction by taking
cognizance of actions not based upon contracts or other matters
that arose at the fair.'s
Normally, the Fair Courts were in continuous session from
eight or nine in the morning until sunset and had jurisdiction over
actions in debt, assumpsit, or trespass and over non-violent crimes.
Generally they had no jurisdiction over questions relating to land
ownership or use, but the courts at St. Ives and Winchester were
exceptions. Where an abbot was conducting the fair, the Ecclesiastical Court might exercise the functions of a Fair Court just as a
Manorial Court might if the fair privilege had been granted to the
lord of a manor. With the establishment of staples having monopolies over the export trade in wool, sheepskins, tin and lead; the
importance of fairs diminished greatly, as did the correlative importance of Fair Courts. The gradual improvement of roads caused
cities, towns, and staples to become more accessible and dominant,
reducing the importance of fairs.
Where the geographical limits of a staple were concurrent with
or less than those of a city or town, a Staple Court had jurisdiction
over mercantile matters only; conventional civil matters were
23. Statements made here about the jurisdiction of the popular courts probably are about 90% correct overall. Twice the Crown had to bring the Fair Courts
back into their proper orbit. See An Act for the Courts of Piepowders, 17 Edw. 4,
ch. 2 (1477). See also An act for the trial of matters in Court of Piepowder held in
fairs, 1 Rich. 3, ch. 6 (1483).
The Staple Courts frequently were used by nonmerchants until curtailed by
Henry VIII. See An Act concerning before whom recognizance of debts shall be
made and the form of the obligation, 23 Hen. 8, ch. 6 (1532).
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within the jurisdiction of the Tolsey Courts or the King's Courts.
Where the staple was a complete and sole entity with respect to a
geographical area, the Staple Courts had a general original jurisdiction, but the judicial procedures and personnel did not change.
These courts were in permanent session and were presided over by
the mayor, who was a lay merchant elected by the other
merchants, or by a prior or consul appointed by the mayor. Juries
were a regular part of the process, and if the action was between
foreigners the jury would be composed of foreigners. If one litigant
was a citizen and the other a foreigner, the jury would be composed one-half of citizens and one-half of foreigners.
Tolsey Court is a name which was given to two types of courts
which were distinct theoretically but usually operated concurrently: town courts and guild courts. The name is derived from the
tollhouse, or "tolsey," which was the equivalent of a village hall
and frequently served as the guildhall as well. In the towns and
boroughs a duplication of facilities and functions was not economic, and the town court and guild court frequently operated together, just as the town hall and guild hall operated together. 81
Commercial Practices in Piepowder and King's Courts
With the description of the basic framework of the courts
presented, it is possible to examine the early commercial law and
practices-the law merchant-in order to understand the roots of
bankruptcy law. It is impossible to make a meaningful portrayal of
the law merchant merely by saying that it is the sum of mercantile
practices, or the total of commercial customs and usages. Essentially it consisted of a combination of mercantile law, which was
completely uncodified, and maritime law, which was patterned
largely on the Laws of Oleron, based upon a French ordinance of
Charles V passed in 1364.2 The most satisfactory method of
describing the substance of the law merchant and its relation to
piepowder courts is to compare aspects of commercial practice
with the common law as administered in the King's Courts. The
23.1. In Bristol, for example, the Fair Court was in session for fourteen days
and the Tolsey Court for the balance of the year, which was consistent with the
usual practice of suspending Tolsey Courts during fairs.
24. See G. MALYNzs, LEx MERCATORIA (1685).
In the early years ships were in the domain of the Admiralty Court, and cargoes were under the jurisdiction of the mercantile courts. Admiralty expanded its
authority consistently and was further enhanced by Henry VIII.
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piepowder courts were preferred in part because of their speed and
economy.
The collection of debts was facilitated in mercantile courts by
giving recognition to the actual practices of the merchant. Bills of
exchange were the conventional mode of payment by merchants
after 1300, and they were transferred freely and successively by
one merchant to his supplier. Upon default, in the mercantile
courts the merchant holding the bill could sue the maker, the
drawee, or any of the endorsers, but at common law he could sue
only his immediate transferor, which could cause as many lawsuits
as there had been transfers. The same situation pertained to promissory notes and their transfers.
Due to the complete absence of survival and revival in the
common law courts before 1330 5 and the limitations with respect
to them afterward, those courts were also unacceptable as a forum
for actions respecting joint ventures, commonly used in the ownership of ships and the insuring of ships and cargoes. In the building
and ownership of ships, each joint venturer normally had a finite
percentage participation. In the insuring of ships and cargoes, each
joint venturer normally had a finite monetary commitment. In the
event of the death of one joint venturer, his share of a liability
could not be enforced against his next-of-kin at common law. In
the mercantile courts a merchant could recover against them, or
the other venturers could enforce payment of the decedent's share
as a contribution.
Additionally, the rigid adherence of the common law courts to
the parol evidence rule would have been particularly disruptive
with relation to contracts calling for payment at some future date,
which most of them did. The usage in London was to allow a three
day grace period; an action at common law would have required
payment on the stated date without any allowance or variation.
Rules respecting the competency of evidence were another major deterrent to the use of common law courts by merchants. At a
25. Executors shall have an action of trespass for a wrong done their testator,
4 Edw. 3, ch. 7 (1330). This act was the primordial cause of the complex language

of § 70a(5) and (6) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, describing property vested in a
trustee in bankruptcy. Cf. In re Thompson, 19 COLLIER BANKI. CAS. 2d (MB) 114,

117 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1978); In re Universal Research Laboratories, Inc., 4 BAMc,.
CT. DEc. (CRR) 1116, 1121 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1978), 19 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d
(MB) 408, 419 (Bankr. N.D. IMI. 1978).
See also Executors of Executors shall have the benefit and charge of the first
testator, 25 Edw. 3, stat. 5, ch. 5 (1350).
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time when businesses were run as proprietorships or partnerships,
the owners might be the only persons who had a direct knowledge
of the transaction at issue, and they would be incompetent to testify at common law because of an interest in the outcome of the
suit. Similarly, the knowledge of disinterested witnesses might be
excluded by the hearsay rule. Neither interest nor hearsay was an
obstruction to testimony or other evidence in the piepowder
courts.
Additionally, that portion of the Statute of Frauds requiring
contracts not to be performed within one year to be in writing was
not applicable in the mercantile courts; otherwise there would have
been severe restraints on overseas ventures. Those ventures respecting the East Indies were seldom performed within one year.
Undoubtedly, the customs in Yorkshire were different from those
in Cornwall, and those in the wool trade were different from those
of silversmiths. Consequently, it would be impossible to catalogue
the customs and usages which comprised the law merchant, not to
mention the fact that usages are evolutionary and change with
time and conditions."0
Legal historians who have considered the question are unanimous in their belief that the law merchant contained provisions for
equitable distribution of the assets of an insolvent debtor among
his multiple creditors. Those historians who engage in presumption
assume that pro rata distribution was at the core of the procedure.17 Because no place in England is very far from tidal water,
mercantile courts in port cities were experienced in dividing salvage and damaged cargo among multiple owners and creditors or
apportioning losses due to marine hazards, storms, leakage, or loss
of cargoes by sinking. It was one short step from allocating the
26. It should be borne in mind that the mercantile courts generally were used
where the dispute was between two merchants. The common law courts, on the
other hand, would be used where one or both parties to a contract were not
merchants. Disputes arose continuously between buyer and seller over such issues
as weight, size, quantity and quality, over which, since the thirteenth century, the
Crown had attempted to establish uniform standards. (There shall be but one
Measure through the Realm, 9 Hen. 3, ch. 25 (1236)). Where a dispute was in a
common law court, no oral or written testimony would be admitted to refute or
alter the language of the contract or the national standard. Where the transaction
was between two merchants, a proceeding in the law courts would have meant
that their transaction would have been litigated on a basis different from that
upon which it had been negotiated.
27. Under all systems of law, that is the most frequent method. It was the
method of the common law and of the civil law.
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assets and liabilities resulting from the disaster to the ship of a
solvent shipowner to allocating the total assets and liabilities of a
ship owner who had become insolvent because of the loss of his
ship. 8
Bankruptcy Law Emerges
A bankruptcy act is a statute the primary purpose of which is
to provide for the equitable distribution of a debtor's assets among
his creditors. The first bankruptcy statute 29 does not fit the definition easily when tested by Lord Coke's gauge. "The mischief and
defect for which the common law did not provide" was a method of
obtaining service upon a fugitive debtor so that his assets might
become subject to legal process. The primary purpose of the act
rather clearly was to eliminate the protection which flight and isolation offered to the assets of a fugitive debtor. The act was directed against the debtor and not in favor of his creditors.
Historically, flight, keeping house, taking sanctuary and collusive imprisonment had been the principal methods of avoiding service of process. Several early statutes focus on the taking of sanctuary to avoid service of process by creditors.80 An example is the
Statute of Lombards which provided a harsh communal penalty
for a debtor's taking sanctuary. If a Lombard took flight to avoid
payment of a debt, the entire company of Lombards would be liable for the debt."1

Asylums provided by the Church protected debtors and also
felons. Westminster, which was adjacent to London and about one28. No salvage operations would have been conducted under the common law

because it provided no compensation to the salvors for the risks which they would
be taking during the salvage operations.
29. See infra note 46(a).

30. One statute provided that collusive gifts made by a debtor who thereafter

took sanctuary might be disregarded by his creditors "as if no such gift had been

made." Fraudulent assurances of lands or goods, to deceive creditors, shall be
void, 50 Edw. 3, ch. 6 (1376).

A second statute provided that a default judgment recovered against a person
taking sanctuary to avoid service after making feigned gifts of goods or lands
should be satisfied out of such property or other property. See infra note 32.

The third statute declared to be void all deeds of gift to defraud creditors

made by persons taking sanctuary; it was entitled Deeds of gift in trust to defraud

creditors by persons who go to sanctuary or other privileged places to be avoided.
3 Hen. 7, ch. 4 (1487).

31. The debt of a Lombard unpaid shall be satisfied by his company, 25 Edw.

3, stat. 5, ch. 23 (1350).
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fourth its size, was the principal asylum. With respect to insolvent
debtors, Richard II had established in 1378 that Westminster

might be an asylum only for those who had become impoverished
by adversity and not for those who became insolvent due to their

own fault.8 2 In a second act he proclaimed that no asylum could
protect a fraudulent debtor against a demand that lie appear. 3

Henry VIII accelerated the restrictions and limitations upon
asylums which had been initiated by several of his forebears.8 4 In
1529, he caused persons taking sanctuary to be branded on their
thumbs with a hot iron,8 ' and in 1535, to wear badges and not to
go abroad between sunset and sunrise.3' In 1540, he extinguished

all sanctuaries except: parish churches and their churchyards,

which were limited to twenty persons each, with a maximum protection of forty days; hospitals; cathedral churches; and the cathedral cities of Derby, Lancaster, Manchester, Northampton, Norwich, Wells, Westminster and York. 7 In 1541, Westchester was

substituted for Manchester, which had decided that freedom from
sheltered felons was more important than the prestige of being a
cathedral city."'
The question arises as to what it was in 1542 which caused a

bankruptcy statute to be enacted, and whether it represented the
continuation of a trend or a major new development.3 An exami32. ROTULI PARLIMENTORUM III at 37 (1378).
33. Statute of Westminster, 2 Rich. 2, stat. 2, ch. 3 (1379).
34. See ROTULI PARLIMENTORUM III (1378); see also infra note 38.
35. An act concerning such as shall take sanctuary for felony or murder, 21
Hen. 8, ch. 2 (1529).
36. An act limiting an order for sanctuaries and sanctuary persons, 27 Hen. 8,
ch. 19 (1535).
37. Concerning sanctuaries, 32 Hen. 8, ch. 12 (1540).
38. For the sanctuary of Manchester, 33 Hen. 8, ch. 15 (1541). (As an interesting historical aside, in the same year was passed what was probably the first
hand-gun control law, The bill for cross-bows and hand-guns, 33 Hen. 8, ch. 6
(1541)).
39. Coke provides only limited insight into the reasons that a bankruptcy law
was enacted at that particular time:
[N]either do we find any complaint in parliament or act of parliament
made gainst any English bankrupt until the 34 year of H.8, when the
English merchant had rioted in three kinds of costliness, viz. costly
building, costly diet and costly apparel, accompanied with neglect of his
trade and servants and thereby consumed his wealth.
4 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 277 (London, 1644). One need
look only at the economy of the 1970's and 1980's to see how a continuing inflation produces an exuberance which promotes excessive expenditures leading to
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nation of the economics of the times does not disclose anything
dramatic in that one year, but there was an inflation running at
about fifteen percent per year. In part, this was due to the awarding of contracts to mint money to favorites of Henry VIII, who
debased the specie by reducing the fine metal content of both gold
and silver coins through alloys of inferior metals. The good coins
fled to Europe or disappeared into local hoards, which produced
Gresham's Law, commonly stated, "bad money tends to drive good
money out of circulation. '" 39"
' The price controls which Henry VIII
had established in 152340 had had no higher degree of success than
the counterparts of Diocletian in 214 and Richard Nixon,4 1 but
there is no indication of the existence of an overall economic program or a fixed objective.
England had lagged 200 to 300 years behind the countries of
central continental Europe in moving from cottage industry to centralized manufacture and from a barter economy to a money and
credit economy. The basic reason for this was that England was
farther from the Mediterranean epicenter of developing civilization. It was separated from central Europe by water, and had prohibited the development of a British merchant marine as well as
forbidden overseas business activities. 2
Just as in commercial affairs, England lagged 200 to 300 years
behind those countries in the development of a bankruptcy law.
This can be attributed primarily to three factors: a lower level of
credit because of a lower level of trade; from before the expulsion
financial collapse.

In the year that the bankruptcy law was passed, Henry Brinklow, a mercer of
the City of London, described the need for it in the following manner:
[T]han ye shall have a parcyell lawe in making of [attachments] first
come, first served, so no one or [two] shall be all payd, and the rest shall
have nothing ....
Wherefor, in that case it was a godly way to make it in Ingland, as it

is in dyverse countrys whan any such change falleth, that than the most

in number of creditors and not in somme shal bynd the rest to doo and

gyve lyke tyme as doo the most of the creditors ... that than the lawe

may bynd them that every man may have pound and pound alyke, as

farre as his goodys will goo, leavying him somewhat as the lawe shal
think good. An this lawe shal be both neyborly and godly.

8 W.

HOLDSWORTH,

A

HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW

232 (1926).

39.1. See generally J. KLEIN, MONEY AND THE ECONOMY 124 (1965).
40. An act for flesh to be sold by weight, 24 Hen. 8, ch. 23 (1523).
41. Economic Stabilization Act of August 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84
Stat. 796.
42. De Stapulis, 27 Edw. 3, stat. 2 (1353).
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of the Jews in 1290 and for another 100 years, finance controlled
largely by the Lombards whose bankruptcies were administered
under their own laws;4s and the existence of a network of mercantile courts which had a system for adjusting financial arrangements
among merchants, who would be the primary objects of legitimate
bankruptcy because they were the primary users of credit.
Just as with the bankruptcy laws of the European countries
which had preceded it by 200 to 300 years, the first English bankruptcy law was directed against fugitives-persons who took flight
in order to avoid paying their bills.44 In England the law was directed as well at persons who avoided service of process by other
means, which devices had not been applicable in Europe for the
most part because of differences in cultural patterns, particularly
in feudal tenure.
Several conclusions can be drawn with respect to what the
conditions were that caused a need in 1542 for a different judicial
procedure in the equitable distribution of a bankrupt's assets.
Non-merchants were becoming creditors; it was a common practice
for non-merchants to make payment in advance for merchandise to
be imported. Merchants upon becoming insolvent would flee or
keep house and no longer would be subject to the commercial pressures of their fellow merchants to settle their affairs in the mercantile courts. The common law courts were not well-equipped to handle multi-party proceedings and had no procedure for collecting
and administering assets. The Chancellor's court had not yet developed to the point where it was acting as a court on a routine
basis, which arrived about one century later.
BANKRUPTCY LAW

As stated above, the statute which generally is considered as
being the foundation stone of bankruptcy law does not fit the definition of a bankruptcy act because it was not directed primarily at

43. When Edward III defaulted on his personal loans from the Bardi and
Peruzzi families in 1340, they were forced into bankruptcy under Florentine law
and paid their creditors, respectively, 70% and 10%. B. JOHNSON, THE POLITICS
OF MONEY (1970); CENTER FOR MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES, UCLA, THE
DAWN OF MODERN BANKING (1979).
44. See Treiman, Escaping the Creditor in the Middle Ages, 43 L.Q. REV.
230 (1927).
A merchant who "made bankrupt" by flight from a mercantile center in continental Europe during the late Middle Ages was called a "Fugitivo." See also
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 62.
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the collection and distribution of a bankrupt's assets, but rather at
preventing him from benefitting from flight.4 ' That was one of
fourteen statutes which properly can be described as bankruptcy
acts. Nine of these were semi-permanent in nature 4 and continued
in force until repealed by a broad comprehensive act passed fifty
years after American independence. 7 One act was designed to be
temporary but was continued semi-permanently until the same
date. 8 One act was operative for only one year," but its major
provisions were retained in another temporary act.' 0 This 1706
temporary act was continued for twenty-five years by a series of
five continuation acts, 51 of which the first two contained sufficient
45. See supra text accompanying note 29 & infra note 46(a).

46. (a) An act against such persons as do make bankrupts, 34 & 35 Hen. 8,
ch. 4 (1542).
(b) An act touching orders of bankrupts, 13 Eliz., ch. 7 (1570).
(c) An act for the better relief of the creditors against such as shall become bankrupts, 1 Jac. 1, ch. 15 (1604).
(d) For the further description of a Bankrupt and Relief of Creditors against such
as shall become bankrupt and for Inflicting Corporal Punishment upon the Bankrupts in special cases, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 19 (1623).
(e) An act for repealing a clause in the statute made in the twenty-first year of the
reign of King James, the First ... which made descriptions of bankrupts and for
the explanation of laws relating to bankruptcy in case of partnershps, 10 Anne,
ch. 15 (1711).
(f) An act for explaining and making more effectual the several acts concerning
bankrupts, 7 Geo. 1, stat. 1, ch. 31 (1720).
(g) An act for amending the laws relating to bankrupts, 19 Geo. 2, ch. 32 (1746).
(h) An act to continue several laws therein mentioned, 24 Geo. 2, ch. 57, § 8
(1751).
(i) An act for preventing inconveniences arising in cases of merchants, and such
other persons as are within the descriptions of the statutes relating to bankrupts,
being entitled to privilege of parliament and becoming insolvent, 4 Geo. 3, ch. 33
(1764).
47. An act to amend the laws relating to Bankrupts, 6 Geo. 4, ch. 16, § 1
(1825).
48. An act to prevent the committing of frauds by bankrupts, 5 Geo. 2, ch. 30
(1732). This was continued by the Act of 1751, 24 Geo. 2, ch. 57, § 8, and by An
act to continue an act made in the fifth year of the reign of his majesty, King
George, the Second, entitled an Act to Prevent the Committing of Frauds by
Bankrupts, 4 Geo. 3, ch. 36 (1764).
49. An act to prevent Frauds frequently committed by Bankrupts, 4 Anne,
ch. 17 (1705).
50. Explaining and amending stat. 4 and 5 Anne, c.4 [sic] for Preventing
Frauds frequently Committed by Bankrupts, 5 Anne, ch. 22 (1706).
51. (a) An act to empower commissioners in commissions of bankrupts, 3
Geo. 1, ch. 12 (1716).

[1982:167]

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS

substantive provisions that they may be classified as bankruptcy

acts as well.
In addition to these fourteen bankruptcy acts and three continuation acts, there were five other statutes of major significance
of which the primary purpose was different but which affected the
potential liability of persons to be prosecuted as bankrupts. Four

of these were laws which either established or promoted East India
Company, Guinea Company, Royal Fishing Trade, Bank of Eng-

land, or South Seas Company." As a means of directing private
capital into risk areas which offered substantial national promise,
the acts provided safeguards to equity investors. The three protections which private investors in these ventures received were that
their stock would not be subject to normal civil process; losses attributable to these specific companies could not serve as the basis
for bankruptcy proceedings against the stockholders; and stockholders of East India Company, Guinea Company and Royal Fishing Trade who received dividends in kind would not be classified

as merchants merely because they sold the goods which they had

received in lieu of cash dividends.
The final statute to be discussed is a general amnesty act of

1747" which granted a pardon to those who served France or
(b) An act for better protecting frauds committed by bankrupts, 5 Geo. 1, stat. 1,
ch. 24 (1718).
(c) An act to continue several acts therein mentioned for preventing frauds committed by bankrupts, 11 Geo. 1, ch. 29 (1724).
(d) An act for continuing the laws therein mentioned relating to copper bars exported: and for better preventing frauds committed by bankrupts ....

13 Geo. 1,

ch. 27 (1726).
(e) An act for continuing and amending an act for regulating the price and assize
of bread; for relief of bankrupts whose certifications were not allowed before the

expiration of the late act ....

3 Geo. 2, ch. 29 (1730).

52. (a) An act Declaratory concerning Bankrupts, 13 & 14 Car. 2, ch. 24
(1662).
(b) For Making Good the Deficiencies of several Funds therein mentioned and for
Enlarging the Capital Stock of the Bank of England and for raising Public credit,
8 & 9 Will. 3, ch. 20, § 47 (1697).
(c) An act for raising a sum not exceeding two millions upon a fund for payment
of annuities after the rate of eight pounds per centum per annum, and for settling
the trade to the East Indies, 9 & 10 Will. 3, ch. 44, § 74 (1698).
(d) An act making good deficiencies and satisfying the public debts and for erecting a corporation to carry on a trade of the South Seas, and for the encouragement of the fishery, and for liberty to trade in unwrought iron with the subjects of
Spain; and to repeal the acts for registering seaman, 9 Anne, ch. 21, § 42 (1710).
53. An act for the King's most gracious, general, and free pardon, 20 Geo. 2,
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Spain in the War of the Austrian Succession. Many classes of persons were excluded from the benefits of the Act, among them
bankrupts.
In hindsight, it appears curious that the statute which has had
the most dramatic effect upon modern bankruptcy practice, the act
of 1705 providing for discharges, was a temporary act expiring by
its own terms in one year. The discharge provision was subjected

to creditor control by the act of 1706, also intended to be tempo-

rary but extended five times.'
The act of 1542"5 established a structure (which was followed
until the Bankruptcy Code) of requiring that an act of bankruptcy
by the debtor initiate the proceedings. The act of 1570' was the
first to limit the class of bankrupts. Whereas only about one-fourth
of the first statute was devoted to the mechanics of a bankruptcy
administration, procedure comprised nine-tenths of the second
statute. The act of 1604'5 established a four month claim period in
ch. 52, § 23 (1747). (The American involvement was called "King George's War"
and was limited largely to Cape Breton Island.)
This article is limited to a discussion of public general laws and has disregarded substantial special and private legislation in England and the American
colonies.
54. See 4 Anne, ch. 17 (1705); 5 Anne, ch. 22 (1706). See also supra note 51.
55. See supra note 46(a).
56. "[Any merchant or other person, using or exercising the trade of merchandise by way of bargaining, exchange, rechange, bartry, chevisance, or otherwise, in gross or by retail, or seeking his or her trade of living by buying and
selling" and being native born or naturalized citizens. 13 Eliz., ch. 7 (1570).
Frequently it is stated that only merchants and traders were subject to bankruptcy proceedings under English law. That generality does not take account of
the fact that there were no limitations under the original act and that there were
about ten changes in the composition of the potential class of bankrupts between
1542 and 1776. For the most part, the changes tended to broaden the class, but
the act of 1706 excluded farmers, graziers and drovers of cattle. The word "farmers" was interpreted broadly in court decisions and tended to exclude owners of
farm property who were engaged in commerce. (The other changes are not of present significance and are of very little historical interest).
57. See supra note 46(c). See also Smith v. Mills, 76 Eng. Rep. 441 (Ex.
1584). Smith v. Mills, referred to as "The Case of Bankrupts," clarified several
aspects of the early statutes, which were concerned with the quantity of the debt
and not the quality. That is, secured creditors and unsecured creditors were
treated alike. The only creditors who were paid were those that instigated the
proceedings or filed claims later. Preferential and collusive transfers to be avoided
were measured from the date of the act of bankruptcy, not from the date of filing
the complaint. See Levinthal, Some HistoricalAspects of Bankruptcy, 7 J. NAT'L
A. REF. BANKR. 22-25 (1932); see also Levinthal, Early History of English Bank-
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which creditors might file their claims, and the act of 162358 provided that secured creditors who had not levied and executed prior
to the bankruptcy filing were to be treated as unsecured creditors.
Persons sympathetic to debtors sometime speak as though
bankruptcy law commenced in 1705 because that was the first statute that permitted a discharge of debts. The discharge provision,
however, was not inserted as an attempt to provide relief for debtors. Rather, it was added because the bankruptcy laws were not
working. Until that time debtors were not coming forward with
their assets. If the debtors did come forward, they were subject, at
any time after the bankruptcy proceeding was completed, to being
thrown into debtors prison for nonpayment of the balance of their
debts remaining unpaid after the distribution to creditors. The impact of the discharge provision can be understood only by one who
appreciates the horror of debtors prisons. It is vitally important to
recognize the distinction between bankruptcy law and its discharge
of the debtor's debts, and insolvency law and its discharge of the
debtor's body.
It would appear that the 1705 act was eminently successful in
getting debtors to come forward with their assets so that they
could receive discharges. In 1706, a new law required the approval
of eighty percent in number and value of the creditors' claims for a
discharge. This started a trend of creditor control which devolved
until the Act of 1867, ultimately leaving the creditors with a veto
power rather than the weapon of affirmative consent. The 1706 act
permitted any debtor to be subject to bankruptcy and excluded
heavy gamblers from a discharge.5 9 The act of 1711 added scriveners but repealed the provisions of all acts which described the subject class susceptible to bankruptcy as in the act of 1604 because
"great mischiefs and inconveniences have happened, especially of
late, to trade and credit in general, by reason of the said description of a bankrupt. . . ."60 The act of 1718"' was a virtual re-enactment of the 1705 act. The act of 1720'2 permitted creditors
holding bills of exchange not yet due and other contingent debts to
file claims, which would be allowed at a five percent discount. The
ruptcy, 8 id. at 104-09 (1934).
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

See supra note
See supra note
See supra note
See supra note
See supra note

46(d).
49-50.
46(e).
51(b).
46(f).
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act of 1732"8 repealed the provision for allowing unmatured debts,
and added bankers, brokers and factors to the bankrupt class,
while permitting a five percent informer's fee.
The act of 1746" granted insured persons who had not yet
suffered a loss the right to file claims against a bankrupt insurer,
which would be allowed if a loss preceded distribution. The act of
175161 was directed primarily at eliminating the collusive practice
of filing false affidavits in order to establish the minimum number
and value of assenting creditors.
The act of 1764" is unique among bankruptcy statutes in that
it expressly is not retrospective. For the first time members of Parliament permitted themselves to be subject to the bankruptcy
laws, but cautiously. Commencing May 11, 1764, creditors could
bring actions against members of Parliament on the basis of debts
contracted after March 8, 1764.
By the time of American independence, it was not ordinarily
significant that a debtor was or was not subject to bankruptcy proceedings. The extraordinary powers of the bankruptcy commissioners did not have to be called into play in order to obtain execution
against a fugitive debtor. Sanctuaries had been abolished,'67 so that
there no longer were privileged places in which a fugitive debtor
might take refuge. Further, substituted service had become available for many types of civil litigation. In addition, the improvement
of roads and communications had made effective flight much more
difficult for a fugitive debtor leaving behind external assets.
In 1776, as now, a creditor ordinarily would execute individually and only would institute bankruptcy proceedings if he wished
to call upon the extraordinary powers of the bankruptcy commissioners to discover assets or to recover fraudulent, collusive or
preferential transfers.
Background of Insolvency Law
An insolvency act was defined as a statute the primary purpose of which is to enable a debtor to avoid imprisonment for
63. See supra note 48.
64. See supra note 46(g).
65. See supra note 46(h).
66. See supra note 46(i).
67. An act for continuing and reviving of diverse statutes and repeal of diverse others, 21 Jac. 1, ch. 28, § 7 (1623).
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debt. 8 The underlying principle of Anglo-American insolvency law
was similar to the cessio bonorum of the Roman law, which enabled a debtor to avoid death, enslavement or imprisonment if he
ceded all of his goods to his creditors. He continued to remain
financially liable for the balance of his debts which remained unpaid, but his body no longer was required to stand for his debts. A
similar mechanical process came to be used in England and in the
American colonies under which the debtor would make an assignment for the benefit of his creditors of all of his assets, save certain
personal exemptions. Having completed the procedure, the debtor
could obtain a judgment that would exempt him from imprisonment for debt but would not affect his liability for the payment of
69
the balance of his debts.
68. See supra p. 19.
69. See Note, Present Status of Execution Against the Body of Judgment
Creditor,42 IOWA L. REV. 306 (1957). See also Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25
MICH. L. REV. 24 (1926); Fox, Process of Imprisonment at Common Law, 39 L. Q.
REV. 46 (1923).
At common law there were two grounds upon which a person might be imprisoned: commission of a felony; and injury to the person or property of another
by force. The form of action under which the latter was prosecuted was trespass
vi et armis.
Until the nineteenth century, misdemeanors were not prosecuted by the
Crown but were considered to be personal wrongs for which only the injured party
might seek redress. From the standpoint of society, the most serious of the misdemeanors were those which employed force, and for that reason, those were the
kind which particularly were discouraged.
As reported by Coke in Harbert's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 647, 656 (Ex. 1584):
"[A]nd therefore against those who committed any force, the common law did
subject their bodies to imprisonment, which is the highest execution, by which he
loses his liberty til he agree with the party, and pay his fine to the King."
Until the fourteenth century actual force had to be proven in an action of
trespass vi et armis because force was an essential element to the recovery. Thereafter, reference to force became merely a formal allegation until 1545, when even
that requirement was dropped. See An Act that an Indictment lacking these
words, vi et armis, shall be sufficient in law. 37 Hen. 8, ch. 8 (1545).
It has been suggested by Various authors that at common law imprisonment
might result from an action in debt. It is submitted that such is a misapprehension which resulted from one or more of the following:
1. mistaking capias ad respondendum for capias ad satisfaciendum;
2. mistaking temporary detention by the sheriff for long term confinement with a warden;
3. confusing imprisonment for outlawry for failing to appear at a
debt trial with imprisonment for the debt itself.
These misapprehensions come easily. A re-reading of the Statute of Westminster,
Second, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 1, ch. 11 (1284) causes the writer to believe that what was
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Imprisonment for Debt
Debtors prisons have been described in Barnaby Rudge, David
Copperfield, Pickwick Papers and elsewhere, and have represented, and continue to represent, the nadir of empathy by valuing
property above humanity. Justinian considered it inhuman to condemn a person to prison because of the misfortunes of fate. Chief
Justice Marshall said, "To punish honest insolvency, by imprisonment for life, and to make this a constitutional principle, would be
an excess of inhumanity which will not be imputed to the illustrious patriots who framed our Constitution, nor to the people who
described in In re Morris, 12 Bankr. 321 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1981), as imprisonment
for debt for bailiffs and agents was more in the nature of a coercive detention
designed to force those auditors to balance their books and settle their accounts
than it was to punish them for non-payment.
At the present time there is a tendency to think of a summons as being a
notice that unwelcome results may occur unless the defendant appears and answers the complaint, and that a default judgment might be the result of inaction.
At common law, on the contrary, a summons was a demand upon the defendant
to appear. If he did not appear voluntarily, he was (or his relatives were) required
to give assurances or pledges to the sheriff that he would appear at the continued
hearing. If he did not appear, the pledges were forfeited, his property might be
attached, and the sheriff was commanded to have him at the next continued hearing by a writ quod habeas corpus ad respondendum (you will have the body at
the hearing). If the defendant did not appear, a writ of capias ad respondendum
would be issued (you will take the body to the hearing). The sheriff would seize
the defendant and hold him in custody until the hearing. If the sheriff could not
find the defendant, another distraint and attachment would issue to take the defendant's lands and chattels into the King's hands. If after one capias, two attachments and four distraints the defendant had not appeared, he was demanded
from county court to county court and outlawed. Persons so outlawed were condemned to perpetual imprisonment, or to abjure the realm.
Another writ, capias ad satisfaciendum (you will take the body until the
debt is satisfied), is more widely known as it is in use today in many states. This
writ permits the defendant's body to be taken until the debt is satisfied; i.e., the
defendant is imprisoned for debt. In the interest of precision, a shorthand device
will be explained. It is stated commonly by authors that imprisonment was based
upon action in debt, detinue and replevin after 1350, (see Process of exigent shall
be awarded in debt, detinue and replevin, 13 Edw. 3, stat. 5, ch. 17 (1350)); actions on the case after 1503, (see Process made under special actions, 19 Hen. 7,
ch. 9 (1503)); and in covenant and annuity after 1531 (see Process of outlawry to
lie in actions in covenant and annuity, 23 Hen. 8, ch. 14 (1531)). Many writers
also aver that after independence imprisonment for debt was prohibited by constitutional or statutory fiat. In many instances, the phrase "imprisonment for
debt" was not employed, but the statute permitted or prohibited the use of capias, such as the act of 1350, for example.
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adopted it."'

The Statute of Acton-Burnel is of particular commercial historical interest because it established a method of preserving nonpossessory liens on chattels by registration and of permitting the
debtor's movables to be sold upon nonpayment of the registered
71

debt.

The degradation of the debtors in the cold, dark, damp, vermin-ridden and rat-infested prisons was aggravated by the knowledge that there was virtually no hope for release. There were periods in which a debtor would be released if his creditors did not pay
for his food and other periods when his food was paid for out of
taxes; but however much of the time it was the debtor's responsibility, and he would be permitted to starve if his relatives did not
72
provide for him.
The cost of maintenance was added to the debt; no credit of
70. Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819).
71. If the debtor had no movables, his body might be taken and kept in
prison:
until that he have made such agreement, or his Friends for him; and if he
have himself in Prison, the Creditor shall find him Bread and Water to
the end that he die not in Prison for Default of Sustenance the which
costs the Debtor shall recompense him with his Debt, before he be let
out of Prison.
Statute of Acton-Burnel, 11 Edw. 1 (1283).
72. If a man be taken in execution and lie in prison for debt, neither the
plaintiff at whose suit he is arrested, nor the sheriff who took him, is
bound to find him meat, drink, or clothes, but he must live on his own, or
on charity of others; if no man will relieve him, let him die in the name
of God, says the law, and so say I.
Manby v. Scott, 86 Eng. Rep. 781 (1659).
The same viewpoint was expressed in Dive v. Maningham, 75 Eng. Rep. 96,
108-09 (1551):
If one be in Execution he ought to live of his own and neither the Plaintiff nor the Sheriff is bound to give him Meat or Drink, no more than if
one distrains Cattle and puts them in a pound, for there the Owner of
the Cattle ought to give them Meat, and not he that distrained them, no
more is the Party or the Sheriff, who has one in Execution bound to give
meat to the Prisoner, but he ought to Live of his own Goods, and if
others will give him nothing, let him die, in the Name of God, if he will,
and impute the cause of it to his own Fault, for his Presumption and ill
Behaviour brought him to that Imprisonment.
Enlisting in the military service was one method of finding a surcease to imprisonment. See An act for the discharging out of prison such insolvent debtors as
shall serve, or procure a person to serve, in Her Majesty's Fleet or Army, 2 & 3
Anne, ch. 10 (1703).
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any kind was offset against the debt, nor was there an opportunity
for the debtor to earn any money while in prison.7 3 Regularly in
her reign, Elizabeth caused a county assessment of taxes to provide

sustenance for debtors who would have starved otherwise.74 The
insolvency act of 167075 required the creditor to pay sixteen pence
per week for the debtor's sustenance, or else the debtor would be

released. Because prison conditions were so deplorable, considera-

ble pressure was placed upon a debtor's friends and relatives to
make payment of his debts. In that sense, debtors prisons may
have been an effective collection device.
The first tangible movement away from imprisonment for debt
was an act of 1566. 70 This statute imposed a mild deterrent upon
creditors by causing them to be subject to six months imprisonment and a treble damage judgment if they caused another person
to become imprisoned for debt improperly. In 1585, by proclamation, Queen Elizabeth established a royal commission for the purpose of examining the subject of imprisonment for debt; the commission's rulings had the force of law, as did similar commissions
established by James I (which survived until his death in 1625)
and by Charles I in 1630. The commissions provided release from
prison for worthy debtors.
73. Presently, in Illinois, the debtor receives a credit of $1.50 for each day
served, to be applied against the judgment; he shall not be imprisoned for more
than six months; and he shall not be confined with persons committed for crimes.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 72, § 331; ch. 77, § 68; ch. 75, § 11 (1979). Chapter 75, § 11 in
Illinois is derived from England's Act of 1670, terminating the practice of the
wardens:
to lodge together in one room or chamber and bed, prisoners for debt
and felons, whereby many honest gentlemen, tradesmen and others, prisoners for debt, are disturbed and hindered in the night-time from their
natural rest, by reason of their fetters and irons, and otherwise much
offended and troubled by their lewd and prophane language and discourses, with most horrid cursing and swearing, most accustomed to such
persons.
An act for the relief and release of poor distressed prisoners for debt, 22 & 23 Car.
2, ch. 20 (1670).
74. See An act for the Punishment of Vagabonds and for Relief of the Poor
and Impotent, 14 Eliz. ch. 5, § 38 (1572). See also An act for Reviewing, continuance, explanation and perfecting of diverse statutes, 35 Eliz., ch. 7, § 14 (1593);
An act for reviewing, continuance, explanation, perfecting, and repealing of diverse statutes, 39 Eliz., ch. 18, § 14 (1597).
75. See supra note 73.
76. An act whereby the Defendant may recover his Costs, being wrongfully
vexed, 8 Eliz., ch. 2 (1566).

[1982:1671

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS

From the time of Cromwell until American independence,
about thirty insolvency acts were passed providing release from
debtors prisons.7 These ranged from the simple acts of 1649 to the
detailed act of 1670, which became the model for most of the colonial insolvency laws. The act of September 4, 1649,78 provided a
release from prison for a person whose wealth did not exceed five
pounds and whose tools of the trade did not exceed five pounds
and who had been imprisoned because of an action in debt. The
act of December 21, 1649,/ provided the same relief to a person
similarly situated where the action had been breach of promise,
contract or covenant. The September act allowed the debtor's family to keep necessary apparel, the December act to keep necessary
apparel and bedding. By the act of April 6, 1650,80 a release was
available from imprisonment for debt of any kind.
The core requirements of the insolvency acts were that the
debtor's assets had to be reduced to a bare minimum by non-collusive distribution to his creditors, and that his debts had not been
incurred through fraud. The early acts provided for release from
prison; the later acts for avoidance of prison, as well.
By and large, the insolvency acts contemplated individual petitions for release by worthy imprisoned debtors. In 1755, a blanket
act was passed which required every sheriff, gaoler, and prisonkeeper to make a list of all of his prisoners incarcerated for debt,
showing for each the date of imprisonment, the amount of debt,
and the names of the creditors causing the prisoner to be there.
Provision was made for three published notices to creditors-both
to those who had and those who had not caused the imprisonment.
Unless cause was shown, discharges from prison would be entered
for all debtors except those who had been denied a discharge in a
prior bankruptcy proceeding.8 1
Upon entering the Marshalsea debtors prison in 1824, the last
77. These were, in large part, initiated by a 1645 Declaration and Appeal
drawn up and signed by 100 debtors in the Fleet as spokesmen for an estimated
8,000 debtors imprisoned in England and Wales for debts not associated with personal extravagance, gambling or fraud.
78. Relief for Poor Prisoners, AcTs & ORDs. INTERRkGNUM, ch. 57 (1649).
79. Further Relief for Poor Prisoners, AcTs & ORDS. INTERREGNUM, ch. 65
(1649).
80. Further Relief for Poor Prisoners, AcTs & ORDS. INTERREGNUM, ch. 6

(1650).

81. An act for relief of insolvent debtors, 28 Geo. 2, ch. 13 (1755) (effectively

terminated March 31, 1757).
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words of John Dickens to his son, Charles, were that the sun had
set on him forever. Deplorable as conditions were in 1824, they
were infinitely worse before the act of 1705," when discharge of
the debt was devised as providing an automatic discharge of the
body as well as of the debt. It is interesting to note that this act
and the American Act of 1874,88 both rather insignificant at the
time of their passage and both designed to benefit creditors,
planted the seed for what has become currently the basic relief for
debtors. The act of 1705, permitting discharge for debtors, although intended to cause more assets to be disclosed and collected
for creditors, is the foundation for most chapter 7 cases. The Act of
1874, permitting composition of debts, is the foundation for chapters 11 and 13.
At the time of independence, all of the colonies with the exception of Connecticut had general insolvency laws." But because
of an inability to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction, colonial
bankruptcy laws were ineffective. Maryland, New Jersey, New
York and Pennsylvania passed private bankruptcy laws from time
to time, usually annulled by the Privy Council. On two occasions
Massachusetts had had a general bankruptcy law, lasting only a
few years each time (1713-16 and 1755-57).
After 1750, the Privy Council (largely for fiscal reasons but
also to permit bankruptcy proceedings) attempted in various ways
to establish an intercolonial system of laws, in which effort Jared
Ingersoll of New Haven was prominent;8 but sectionalism, local
pride, and a distaste for central authority thwarted the movement.
During the period of the Articles of Confederation, Rhode Island
enacted a bankruptcy law which was a curious hybrid between general and special legislation. A general law provided that special applications could be made to the legislature. A private law of this
type, passed in 1816 upon the application of an imprisoned debtor,
became the ground of one of a number of important constitutional
decisions as to whether a law releasing a person from prison but
82.

See supra note 49.

83. See infra note 127.
84. The acts of the Connecticut colonial legislature were not subject to approval by the Privy Council, contrary to the situation in other colonies, so that
Connecticut was immune to the disfavor of the Privy Council respecting special
legislation. It had had a general insolvency law from 1763 to 1764 and from 1765
to 1767, but for the most part it passed several private insolvency laws each year.
Connecticut also passed private bankruptcy laws from time to time.
85. See L. GIPSON, AMERICAN LOYALIST: JARED INGERSOLL (1971).
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not affecting the liability for payment of a debt constituted an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of a contract." The
cases held unanimously that it did not, as the release was only a
part of the remedy of enforcement and did not affect the right of
liability. This rationale has been expanded tremendously and was
the constitutionality of section 77 of the 1933
used to support
8 7
amendment.
The American Act of 1841 was the most decisive new development in bankruptcy law after independence. The act provided for
voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy. Heretofore the only actions
which debtors could initiate were proceedings to free their bodies
but leaving their economic futures fettered by their continuing
debts. The Act of 184188 not only freed their bodies and their futures, but also it placed in the hands of the debtors the ability to
initiate the process. In a theoretical sense this represented the culmination of the merger of the voluntary debtor-initiated discharge
of the body insolvency law into the involuntary creditor-initiated
discharge of the debts bankruptcy law. This merger resulted in a
broader bankruptcy law where the process might be initiated either by the debtor or by the creditor, while providing for the discharge of both the body and the debts. The 1841 act was not of
long duration, but all subsequent acts also have permitted voluntary actions by debtors and discharges.
Retroactivity
Justice James C. McReynolds has stated: "The especial purpose of all bankruptcy legislation is to interfere with the relations
86. See Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370 (1827).

On one side of the line of cleavage is the unreported case of Champion and
Dickinson v. Casey, (see Hynning, Constitutionality of Moratory Legislation, 12
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 182, 191 (1934)) in which the Court held unconstitutional a

1791 Rhode Island private act giving a debtor a three-year extension of time to
settle his accounts with his creditors and a three-year exemption from arrests and
attachments. That case may be considered as affecting a creditor's right to payment. Affecting a creditor's remedy in the event of non-payment are cases holding
that subsequent changes in the law to permit the release of a debtor from prison
are not an impairment of the obligation of the contract between the debtor and
creditor because imprisonment is not a part of the contract. Beers v. Haughton,
34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329 (1835); Penniman's Case, 103 U.S. 714 (1880).
87. See Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Chicago, R.I. and P. Ry., 294 U.S. 648,
681 (1935) ("The injunction here goes no further than to delay the enforcement of
the contract. It affects only the remedy.")
88. The Bankruptcy Act of 1841, 5 Stat. 440.
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between the parties concerned-to change, modify or impair the
obligation of their contracts."' 9 Much has been written about the
issue of retroactivity with respect to the operative aspects of the
Bankruptcy Code in which the authors have argued by analogy or
otherwise have not examined underlying bankruptcy principles.
For example, it has been stated on a number of occasions that statutes usually are prospective, and therefore the Bankruptcy Code
should operate prospectively. This is like saying that fruit usually
is sweet, and therefore lemons are sweet. A more precise use of
terms should clear up much of the misunderstanding."
One cause of confusion in the use of the word "retroactive" is
that it has nunc pro tunc overtones, as when the avoidance of a
preferential or fraudulent transfer relates back and negates an action previously taken. To avoid that confusion, "retrospective"
generally will be used to indicate the taking of present action
based upon conditions which existed before the operative date of
the statute.
Occasionally the terms "universal" or "comprehensive" are
used to describe a statute which is both retrospective and prospective, but they have the disadvantage of being used in other contexts with geographical or jurisdictional implications. The term
"Janusian," after the two-faced Roman god who could look into
the past and the future simultaneously, can be used to describe a
statute which is both retrospective and prospective in application.
Virtually all bankruptcy statutes are Janusian, a time-reference
term with no jurisprudential qualities.
Those acts which are retrospective only are such because of
economic and political reasons and essentially are debtor-relief
laws. The most common of these are stay laws, which have been a
part of the American rural economic history since the colonial period. In times of economic recession, state legislatures adopt laws
89. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298

U.S.

513, 530 (1936).
90. An example may delineate the problem: Suppose that Congress should
decide to adopt the English system of an annual excise tax upon the ownership of
television sets, to become operative July 1, 1982.
1. If the tax is assessed in 1983 on sets purchased after July 1, 1982, it is
prospective.
2. If the tax is assessed in 1983 on all sets owned, including those owned
before July 1, 1982, it is retrospective, as well as being prospective.
3. If the tax is assessed in 1982 on the basis of ownership before July 1, 1982,
it is retroactive for 1982 and retrospective and prospective for 1983.
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which by one means or another stop farm mortgage foreclosure
proceedings.
If the laws were prospective as well as retrospective, no new
mortgages would be written. A potential mortgagee would not advance money if he knew that he could not foreclose in the event of
default. The same economic principle causes apportionment laws
to be retrospective only. If a statute provides that an existing debt
may be satisfied by payment of two-thirds of the amount due, it is
a boon to the debtors. If the law were prospective as well, all prices
immediately would rise by fifty percent, so that in real terms a
seller would continue to be able to acquire comparable quantities
of commodities in exchange for his inflated currency.
The Frazier-Lemke Act, which was the subject matter of Louisville Joint Land Bank v. Radford,9 ' was at heart an augmented
stay law, and for that reason it was retrospective only. All other
Anglo-American bankruptcy laws have been Janusian with the exception of the act of 1764," which permitted members of Parliament to become involuntary bankrupts but only with respect to
future debts. With the exception of the Bankruptcy Code, all other
American acts have been directed primarily toward adjusting past
debts, while accommodating future debts as well. The Act of 180098
was directed toward settling affairs disrupted by the Panic of 1797.
Likewise, subsequent acts were passed in response to other social,
economic or political conditions. The Act of 1841," followed the
Panic of 1837; the Act of 1867" was enacted after the Civil War;
the Act of 189896 followed the Panic of 1893; and the 1930's acts
including the Chandler Act, 9 7 were a response to the 1929-1937
Depression.
Various examples can be given as to why it is the nature of
bankruptcy laws to be retrospective. The best example is to imagine that it were otherwise. If a debtor were able only to adjust

66.

91. 295 U.S. 555 (1935); see supra note 18.
92. See supra note 46(i) and accompanying text, and text accompanying note

93.
94.
95.
96.

The Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19.
See supra note 88.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 517.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544 [hereinafter referred to as the

Bankruptcy Act or simply the Act].

97. Act of March 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-420, 47 Stat. 1467; Act of June 7,
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-296, 48 Stat. 911; The Chandler Act of June 22, 1938, Pub.

L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 [hereinafter cited as Chandler Act].
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post-effective debts, it would mean that only post-effective creditors would be able to share in his assets. While it is true that the
pre-effective debts would not be discharged, the pre-effective creditors would be left holding an empty bag because all of the debtor's
assets would have been distributed to his post-effective creditors.
If the 1978 Bankruptcy Code had been solely prospective, only
now would filings in volume be made under its provisions. This is
because it would have taken most debtors several years to have
accumulated sufficient debt to cause a personal financial problem.
If bankruptcy acts were not retrospective or Janusian, it would be
impossible to reorganize a corporation of any size because typically
corporations will have some long term debt. If pre-effective debt or
leases could not be adjusted, nothing could be done with railroads,
many of which have 999 year leases and a few of which have perpetual bonds.
Most corporate bonds carry maturities of twenty to thirty
years. If bankruptcy laws were not retrospective, twenty to thirty
years would have to pass before a reorganization could be conducted of a corporation whose bond issue was contemporaneous
with the passage of the law. As a matter of arithmetic probability,
it appears likely that ninety percent of all of the debt reorganized
under sections 74, 75, 77 and 77B was created five years or more
before the different sections were enacted in 1933 and 1934 as
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. Further, that fifty percent of
all debt reorganized under chapters X, XI, and XII was created
ten years or more before their enactments in 1938.
State laws which are retrospective may encounter consitutional difficulties if they are considered as impairing the obligation
of existing contracts but that is not a federal problem, as such.
Retrospectivity of federal laws raises the question of reasonableness-too broad a subject to attempt to summarize here, but falling under one of two clauses of the fifth amendment, which states
in pertinent part: "No person shall. . . be deprived of. . . property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." 8
One of the two phases of bankruptcy law, that of creditor versus creditor, focuses on the equitable distribution of assets among
creditors. This phase of the law is not only retrospective but also
may be retroactive in the sense that some things which had been
done are undone; most notably liens may be disregarded or
98. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
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avoided so that one creditor does not obtain more than his fair
proportionate share of the debtor's assets. Both diligence and collusion are swept aside retroactively so that one creditor will not be
favored above the rest.
On the other side is debtor versus creditor law, which usually
is retrospective as a matter of economics. Stay laws are the most
common and possibly the best example of a two-way tension. If
future credit is to be fettered, it will not be offered, or will be offered at higher rates. If future mortgages cannot be foreclosed,
they will not be written.
Most debtor versus creditor laws are state laws, the retrospective application of which only would have been tested by the contract clause until shortly after the Civil War and by either the contract clause or the fourteenth amendment since 'then. Somewhat
over-simplified, the result has been that broad changes with retrospective application have not been sustained except where the
courts have held that the changes were procedural and affect the
remedy and were not substantive and affecting the right.
In summary, a generality may be in order. Permanent legislation affecting the relationship of creditors among themselves will
be Janusian, as will permanent legislation affecting the contractual
relationships between debtors and creditors. Emergency legislation
may be retrospective only, prospective only or Janusian. If it is
prospective, it will have a short duration only because by its nature
it is drastic and contrary to the basic economic principles which
had existed previously. Stay laws, apportionment laws, and tender
laws can be retrospective only if the future economy is to become
stablized; other than those, there is little pure moratory legislation.
The closing of banks, stock exchanges and other types of businesses usually is accompanied by prohibiting the ownership of gold
or changing the conversion rights respecting domestic currency or
foreign exchange. Thus, the suspension of business is temporary,
and the balance of these laws is Janusian. Property tax laws are
Janusian. Income tax laws are prospective with respect to earned
income but occasionally are Janusian with respect to capital gains.
EARLY AMERICAN DEBTOR RELIEF LAWS

During as well as before America's life as an independent nation, the economy has been the subject of cyclical swings between
expansion and recession. Colonial and state legislatures frequently
have been concerned with the plight of debtors who were being
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forced to pay for prosperity purchases with depression dollars.99
Two different legislative approaches had a major influence upon
the wording of the Constitution and were of the type which was
the subject of Radford, upon which Rodrock and Gifford rely so
heavily.
Ameliorating Fiscal Legislation
The simplest way for a govenmental body to relieve its citizenry of debt burden is to debase its currency.1 00 During the period

of the Confederation, many of the states issued paper money. This
was done particularly in the Southern states, which were the hardest pressed during the recession which preceded the Constitutional
Convention by about two years. The Southern states also passed
laws making tobacco or land legal tender for the payment of debts.
In practice, much of the land used in payment was swamp land."1
99. See generally Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study, 46
HARV. L. REV. 1061 (1933); Hynning, Constitutionality of Moratory Legislation,
12 CHI.-KENT L. REV.

182 (1934).

100. The most common methods are to lower the fine metal content of the
specie but maintain the same extrinsic (nominal) value; to raise the extrinsic
(nominal) value but retain the same intrinsic (metallic) value; to issue paper
money; or to increase the conversion rate of paper money into gold or silver. Several of the colonies had issued paper money until restrained by Parliament. See
An Act to Prevent Paper Bills of Credit, hereafter to be issued in any of his Majesty's colonies or plantations in America, from being declared to be legal tender in
payment of money, 4 Geo. 3, ch. 34 (1764). After independence there was no
outside force which could impose a discipline upon the states.
101. The history, indeed, of the various laws, which were passed by the
states in their colonial and independent character upon this subject, is
startling at once to our morals, to our patriotism, and to our sense of
justice. Not only was paper money issued, and declared to be tender in
payment of debts; but laws of another character well known under the
appelation of tender laws, appraisement laws, installment laws, and suspension laws, were from time to time enacted, which prostrated all private credit, and all private morals. By some of these laws the due payment of debt was suspended; debts were, in violation of the very term of
the contract, authorized to be paid by installments at different periods,
property of any sort, however worthless, either real or personal, might be
tendered by the debtor in payment of his debts, and the creditor was
compelled to take the property of the debtor which he might seize on
execution at an appraisement wholly disproportionate to its known value
....
They entailed the most enormous evils on the country, and introducing a system of fraud, chicanery, and profligance which destroyed all
private confidence and all industry and enterprise.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1365
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The outgrowth of these laws is that the Constitution provides: "No
State shall... coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts .... 102
Moratory Legislation
Traditionally, farm real estate mortgages have been one of the
first areas to receive legislative attention at the time of a recession.
However, in the last several decades this has not been apparent as
agricultural price supports have kept farm prices moderately high
in relation to farmers' costs, and various governmental agencies
have provided direct and indirect mortgage financing relief. Numerous devices may be used to prevent or delay mortgage foreclosures. The most drastic of these devices, called stay laws, ban foreclosure proceedings and are a part of the basis for the wording of
the constitutional prohibition: "No State shall ... pass any...
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....
The Frazier-Lemke Acts essentially were stay laws at the federal level. 104 In order to supersede state foreclosure laws, it was essential for the statutory grant of authority to be auxiliary to an
express power given to Congress under Article I. This would bring
the grant within the ambit of the supremacy clause. The bankruptcy power was the express power which was selected as being
the most appropriate.
The principal types of moratory and relief legislation and of
court practices, both before and after the adoption of the Constitution, have been directed toward mortgage foreclosure but some
have covered contract enforcement, as well.10 The court decisions
(1833).
102. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 18.
105. Typical provisions include:
(a) restrain or suspend proceedings;
(b) permit dilatory pleadings;
(c) provide for continuance orders;
(d) delay trial or judgment;
(e) postpone sales;
(f) direct court to establish upset price in advance of sale;
(g) permit court to refuse to confirm sale where a fair bid was not made;
(h) require price to equal or exceed appraisal;
(i) deduct fair value of the property from the amount of the deficiency;
(j) curtail or abolish deficiencies;
(k) extend period of redemption.
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which have supported state laws of this nature largely have been
based on the theory that the law affected the remedy and not the
right, or the law represented a valid exercise of the police power in
1 08
the time of an emergency.
It has been demonstrated that for economic reasons certain
kinds of moratory legislation must be retrospective only, otherwise
they will provide a barrier to future financing. If a ban on mortgage foreclosure applied to mortgages made in the future, there
would be no mortgages made in the future. Similarly, the Bankruptcy Commission had intended originally to have the lien avoidance of nonpurchase-money household goods apply to purchasemoney liens as well, until it realized that this more than likely
would put an end to installment purchases of consumer goods in
the future. 107
ConstitutionalConvention
The approach of American independence did not signal an immediate blend of insolvency and bankruptcy law. In fact, there was
no marked subsidence in the bifurcated legal scheme until the
1840's when the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 permitted voluntary
bankruptcy petitions, and general antipathy toward debtors prisons caused their abolition or reduction in use.
At the time of independence, it is estimated that about 50,000
persons were being imprisoned for debt each year. Of these, about
8,000 remained in prison at the end of the year. Thus, one person
in every sixty was being imprisoned each year in a growing nation
that had a manpower shortage. The debts which caused the imprisonment generally were of twenty dollars or less.'10 There were
106. See Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917). See also Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Levy Leasing co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922);
Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Block v. Hirsch, 256
U.S. 135 (1921).
107. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 130-31.
108. See Ford, supra note 69. Interpolations of 1830 statistics break down

the amount of debt owed to the instigating creditor as:
Debts of $5 or less
Debts between $5 and $20
Debts between $20 and $100
Debts over $100

7,500 persons
27,500 persons
10,000 persons
5,000 persons

50,000 persons
It may be presumed that in most instances other debts were owed as well as that
of the instigating creditor. It has been assumed that the 1787 figures on debtor
imprisonment would be about equal to the stated 1830 figures because although
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about twelve times as many writs of arrest issued as actual imprisonments, which suggests that the threat of imprisonment was an
effective collection device as well as being a routine procedure. The
figures(which make no allowance for lack of prosecution) suggest
that eleven out of twelve cases were settled between writ issuance
and imprisonment, five out of six settled during the first year of
imprisonment, and seventy-four out of seventy-five within the first
year of instituting process. There are no readily available statistics
on the number of insolvency cases filed each year, nor on the
breakdown between those requesting to be released from prison
and those seeking to avoid imprisonment. Usually the cost of
maintaining an insolvency proceeding would have been large in relation to the size of the instigating debt. Therefore, it is presumed
that payment of debt rather than insolvency was the course that
small debtors usually followed to avoid prison. 1 "
The foregoing figures are misleading if read to mean that
50,000 different individuals were imprisoned each year. The absence of a bankruptcy law meant that creditors usually would prosecute individually, rather than collectively. Thus, it is probable
that the 50,000 cases of imprisonment involved considerably fewer
different individuals, and that many of the debtors were prosecuted consecutively by other creditors.
As the delegates to the Constitutional Convention assembled
in Philadelphia in 1787, they were aware of the operation of colonial insolvency laws and of the English bankruptcy laws, both from
the perspective of colonial creditors of English bankrupts and of
American debtors of English creditors with assets in England subject to process there."1 0 They were aware also of the self-protective
the population was 25% less, virtually the entire 1787 population was subject to
imprisonment, but by 1830 the citizens of many states had been exempted by
state constitution or statute.

109. See id. at 29-31.
110. Neither bankruptcy nor insolvency was an issue which generated contro-

versy, so there was little discussion of either and no debate. Controversial issues,
such as taxation and federal-state relations, produced such divisions that little

time was devoted to non-controversial issues. The consensus was that bankruptcy
should be a national power and insolvency a state power.
Throughout the development of the two aspects of debtor-creditor law, the
proceedings had been conducted by separate branches of the court in separate

courtrooms. Normally the insolvency court was not concerned with distributions
among creditors:
(a) if the debtor was in prison, his assets had been taken over already by normal civil process of individual creditors or by bankruptcy
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efforts of the individual states to provide relief to their own debtors by issuing paper money and by adopting stay laws, tender laws
and installment laws during the continuing recession which had
been in progress for several years.
United States Constitution
During the first fifty years under the Constitution the provisions which had the most direct impact on bankruptcy questions
were the bankruptcy clause,' the supremacy clause,"' the reservation of power clause,118 and the contract clause." In the last one
hundred and fifty years, the principal areas of tension have been
addressed under the police power clause' 15 and the fifth"16 and
117
fourteenth amendments. '
There was no national bankruptcy law for twelve years, and
the Act of 1800 survived a mere two and one-half years out of its
projected five year duration. A vacuum existed because of the failure of Congress to exercise its express bankruptcy power."18 A logiproceedings, and
(b) if the debtor was not in prison, his assets had been distributed
among his creditors by an assignment for their benefit.
The establishment of separate courts for bankruptcy and insolvency cases in
England came after American independence. See An Act for the Relief of Insolvent Debtors in England, 1 Geo. 4, ch. 119 (1820), establishing The Court for
Relief of Insolvent Debtors. See also An Act to Establish a Court in Bankruptcy,
1 & 2 Will. 4, ch. 56 (1831).
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4: "The Congress shall have Power ... To
establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States. .. ."
112. Id. art. VI, § 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the
Land .... "
113. Id. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
114. Id. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1: "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts . .. ."
115. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1: "The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for
the... general Welfare of the United States...."
116. Id. amend. V: "No person shall... be deprived of... property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."
117. Id. amend. XIV, § 1: "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of...
property, without due process of law .... "
118. Professor Nadelmann has written an excellent account of the genesis of
the bankruptcy clause in the Constitution which is readily available and will serve
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cal argument can be made that the framers of the Constitution anticipated that all of the powers expressly granted to Congress
would be exercised on a permanent basis. With the exception of
the war powers, the bankruptcy power is the only express power
which was not exercised almost immediately and continuously. If
this argument is correct, the bankruptcy powers (including discharge from debts) would have been available continuously under
federal legislation; and state laws would have existed in parallel,
providing for the discharge of the bodies of debtors who had not
been discharged of their debts. State insolvency laws were enacted
as expected; but in the absence of a federal law respecting the discharge of debts, many of the state laws contained provisions respecting not just the discharge of the debtors' bodies but also of
their debts.
Three early Supreme Court decisions11 dealt with the issue of
the reader much better than a present summary. He did not deal with the contract clause, discussed infra at note 119, nor with the gap between the two, nor
with the social and economic effect of the gap during the first fifty years of life
under the Constitution when there did not exist a comprehensive, permanent
structure which would enable debtors to obtain a fresh start after they had distributed all of their assets to their creditors. See Nadelmann, On the Origin of the
Bankruptcy Clause, 1 AM. J. oF LEGAL HIST. 215 (1957).
119. "No question of private international law has given more trouble to the
courts of the different States and of the United States during the present century
than the question what effect a discharge in insolvency should have upon nonresidents." Bailey, A Discharge in Insolvency, and its Effect on Non-Residents, 6
HARv. L. Rnv. 349 (1893).
In Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819), there is no indication of where the parties lived, nor where was the place of payment of two promissory notes which Crowinshield had executed in New York. Sturges sued Crowinshield in Massachusetts, to which Crowinshield pleaded a New York discharge on
February 15, 1812, under a New York law passed April 3, 1811. The notes were
dated March 3, 1811, and payable, respectively, August 1, 1811, and August 15,
1811. The court held that the discharge did not eliminate liability on the notes, in
language which would have supported three separate lines of reasoning.
In McMillan v. McNeill, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 209 (1819), both parties were
citizens of South Carolina where the contract was made. Subsequently, the defendant moved to Louisiana, which had an insolvency law that was in existence at
the time that the contract was executed. The plaintiff sued in Louisiana, and the
defendant pleaded his discharge under the Louisiana law. The Chief Justice, citing Sturges, was understood to have said that the fact that the law preceded the
contract did not make any difference. The common understanding among lawyers
reading the two cases together was that no state bankruptcy law would be constitutional, whether it was prospective, retrospective or Janusian, because it would
impair contracts.
Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827), completed the trilogy and
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the constitutionality of the state laws but in language so philosophical, theoretical and abstruse that even the Justices could not
agree among themselves on what the plurality decision had been in
Ogden v. Saunders, although this was clarified by a subsequent
opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson who represented the swing vote. It
is submitted that permitting the states to exercise the bankruptcy
power in the absence of a federal exercise was a political decision.
This may help to explain why the rationale in each of the opinions
was so ephemeral. Apparently, the Court did what its members believed had to be done in the interest of comity. An example of the
enigmatic language is the conclusion of Chief Justice Marshall to
one aspect of Sturges:
[U]ntil the power to pass uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies be exercised by Congress, the States are not forbidden to
pass a bankrupt law, provided it contain no principle which violates the 10th section of the first article of the [C]onstitution of
the United States.
This opinion renders it totally unnecessary to consider the

question
whether the law of New York is, or is not, a bankrupt
10
law. 2

The amalgam of the three cases is that a state bankruptcy law, in
the absence of a federal law, may operate prospectively to discharge debts owed to residents of that state.
After about 1840 the pressure to enact laws permitting the discharge of the bodies of debtors was reduced because of either the
elimination of authority for imprisonment or constitutional and
statutory prohibitions against imprisonment. The impetus for this
was derived to a considerable extent from the New York prohibition in 1831. All presently existing debtors imprisonment laws include a maximum duration of imprisonment.
concerned several bills of exchange dated September, 1806, drawn in Kentucky,
where the drawer and payee were residents. The bills were accepted in New York
by the drawee, Ogden, who was a New York resident. In the suit of the payee,

Saunders, upon non-payment at maturity, Ogden pleaded a discharge which he

had obtained in New York on April 19, 1808, under a law enacted in 1801 and
under which he had made an assignment of all of his assets for the benefit of
creditors. (There is no indication as to why Saunders did not share in that assignment; it may be inferred that the bills had matured before the discharge.) On the
question of whether a state discharge law which operates prospectively is constitutional, the court upheld the statute four to three. On the question of whether a
New York law operating prospectively could affect the rights of a citizen of another state, it was held that it could not, again by a four to three vote.
120. 17 U.S. at 196-97.
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CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW

Current discussion of the constitutionality of the Bankruptcy
Code focuses on the Radford case and legislation in the 1930's.
Their treatment will be preceded by a highlighting of bankruptcy
legislation which had been enacted prior to that time to provide a
broader basis of understanding. With the exception of the current
Bankruptcy Code, all of the American bankruptcy laws have been
the outgrowth of an economic recession.
The Act of 1800121 was a result of the Panic of 1797. This act
continued the principle of an involuntary proceeding by creditors
against an expanded class of mercantile debtors. T~he bankrupt was
discharged of his debts and allowed to keep five percent of the
amount recovered. Discharge was conditioned upon receiving the
assent of two-thirds of the creditors with claims over fifty dollars.
This followed the English rule of the act of 1706,122 which was the
first act requiring creditor consent (eighty percent) and counted
only claims over $100. Future due debts were allowed and payable
pro rata at a discounted value. Property acquired by the debtor
during the period of administration became a part of the estate
and was subject to distribution to creditors. The act continued the
provisions of existing English law in that a discharge of the debts
would not be granted in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding unless the creditors in the current case received seventy-five percent
of their claims. Contrary to the act of 1623, s the Act of 1800 did
not impair liens. The bankrupt was granted a living allowance during the pendency of the case. One innovation was to recognize any
priority allowed to the United States under non-bankruptcy
12 4
laws.
The Act of 1841125 was a consequence of the Panic of 1837.
The most significant feature of this act is that it produced the
merger of bankruptcy law and insolvency law by permitting voluntary proceedings. It allowed any person to file. Involuntary proceedings, on the other hand, continued to be limited to a broad
mercantile class. Another innovation of great significance was permitting the trustee to recover preferential payments to creditors.
121.
122.
123.
124.
note 48.
125.

See supra note 93.
See supra note 50.
See supra note 46(d).
As in the act of 1732, informers were allowed five perccent. See supra
See supra note 88.
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Previously the power had been directed toward the setting aside of
collusive and fraudulent transfers. A discharge became presumptive and would be granted unless a majority of the creditors dissented. The priority on debts owed to the United States was
granted to subrogees who paid the debtor's taxes under compulsion. A priority also was granted to laborers' wages, not to exceed
twenty-five dollars, for work performed within the six months
preceding filing. Contingent claims were allowed.

The Act of 1867126 was designed to reduce the economic tur-

moil resulting from the Civil War. As a voluntary proceeding, any
person residing in the United States with debts exceeding $300
and unable to pay his debts in full might file; there was no discharge for fraudulent debts. The act established four priorities for
payment: expenses of administration; debts due the United States;
debts due the state of the forum; and wage claims, not to exceed
fifty dollars, earned in the six months preceding filing.
In an involuntary proceeding it was not necessary to have the
consent of creditors to a discharge; but in a voluntary proceeding,
unless there was a fifty percent dividend, it was necessary to have
of claims. An
the consent of a majority in number and value
127
compositions.
for
provided
1874
in
amendment
The Act of 1898128 was a product of the Panic of 1893. As
adopted, the act consisted of seventy-two sections divided functionally into seven chapters. Railroads, municipalities, and building and loan associations were excluded as voluntary bankrupts or
as involuntary bankrupts; wage earners and farmers also were excluded as involuntary bankrupts. Section 12 provided for compositions, but it was cumbersome and seldom used. A switch was made
from the traditional "ability to pay debts as they became due" test
to a "balance sheet" test to determine eligibility. Probably the
largest amount of litigation under the Act resulted from using a
creditor versus creditor yardstick to establish a debtor versus creditor liability. Because non-dischargeable debts were as entitled to
distribution as were dischargeable debts, there was a provision that
126. See supra note 95.

127. Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390,

§ 17, 18 Stat. 182. Section 1 of that

amendatory act provided that the assignee elected by the creditors (i.e., the trus-

tee in bankruptcy) could carry on the business of the bankrupt for nine months.
Section 2 provided that in an involuntary bankruptcy it was not necessary to obtain creditor consent nor make a distribution to creditors in order to obtain a
discharge.
128. See supra note 96.
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the former had to be proven and allowed (that is, verified and
timely filed) in the same manner as the latter.1 2 ' Years later, when
no asset estates became the general rule (obviating the hope for a
distribution and the reason for proof and allowance of a claim
before dischargeability could be considered), passing the hurdles of
allowability and provability continued to be necessary before addressing the question of dischargeability.
A 1910 amendment gave the trustee a theoretical lien as of the
date of filing which caused him to have an interest superior to that
of unsecured creditors. The Supreme Court determined that the
Congress had not intended that the broadened power apply to interests existing prior to the date of enactment. Thus, the Court
was not presented with a constitutional problem.130 Cases generally
were referred from the district courts to referees in bankruptcy.
In 1933 broader composition powers were provided, as well as
relief for farmers. In 1934, under section 77B, broad powers were
given to majorities of creditor groups to adjust debts and property
rights. These powers were continued and expanded in 1938 under
the Chandler Act,181 consisting of chapters X, XI, XII and XIII,
the last of which provided extensions and composition to wage
earners. On March 3, 1933, a new chapter VIII was added which
consisted of:
section 73-enabling jurisdiction,
section 74-compositions and extensions,
section 75-agricultural compositions,
section 76-extensions of obligations of guarantors (probably unconstitutional-repealed June 22, 1938),
section 77-reorganization of interstate railroads.
In May, 1934, a chapter IX was added which provided:
section 78-declaration of policy,
section 79-additional jurisdiction,
section 80-municipal debt adjustments.
The issue of the constitutionality of chapter IX was presented
in Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No.
1.152 The act was held unconstitutional on the ground that it ef129. "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts .... except such as .. .have not been duly scheduled in time for
proof and allowance . . . ." Bankruptcy Act § 17a(3).
130. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was amended June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No.
62-293, 36 Sat. 838. See Holt v. Henry, 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
131. Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
132. 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
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fected an improper delegation of state responsibility to the federal
government. As is customary in reorganization proceedings, the
bankruptcy judge was required to oversee and control the day-today operations of the debtor, which meant that a federal official
was controlling the fiscal and administrative operations of a municipality. On strict analysis, this is the only instance in which the
Supreme Court has held a bankruptcy law be unconstitutional.18" 1
(The Court avoided the constitutional issue in Holt v. Henley;88
and Radford 8" did not involve a bankruptcy act, but rather an
augmented stay law appended to a bankruptcy act.) Immediately
Congress adopted a new law designated chapter X.185 This law consisted of:
section 81-additional jurisdiction,
section 82-definitions,
section 83-permitting compositions,
section 84-termination on June 30, 1946 (repealed).
The constitutionality of chapter X was upheld in United States v.
Bekins."8 As a part of the 1938 additions of the Chandler Act,
chapter IX was repealed, and chapter X was renumbered IX.
A new section 75 was added to the Bankruptcy Act in 1933187
with the thought that the powers for extensions and compositions
enumerated there would be of considerable benefit to farmers,
whose financial distress was considerably greater than that of the
general populace. Section 75 provided this relief with the consent
of a majority of the creditors, both in number and in dollar
amount. That consent seldom was forthcoming, which caused section 75 to be ineffective. Usually it was a mortgagee which held a
majority of the debt and would not consent. It appears likely that
it was not so much an unwillingness which caused the mortgagees
not to consent as it was financial strains of their own. Mortgagees
who also had a security interest in growing crops were more willing
132.1 However, after this article was submitted for publication, the Supreme
Court held the jurisdictional provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to be unconstitutional. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858
(1982) [Eds.].

133. 232 U.S. 637 (1914).

134. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); see
infra notes 149-90 and accompanying text.
135. Act of August 16, 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-302, 50 Stat. 653 (amending the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544).
136. 304 U.S. 27 (1938). See Act of June 7, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-296, 48 Stat.
911.
137. See Act of March 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-420, 47 Stat. 1467.
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to consent to a composition because they could look to a cash flow.
Extrapolating from sketchy statistics, it looks as if in the middle
1930's, about eight percent of the bankruptcy cases filed were
under section 75. Of those cases, about twelve to fifteen percent
produced creditor consent,18 with the remainder resulting in an
application for adjudication under section 75(s). 139
The Great Depression
Most of the decisions which have considered the constitutionality of section 522(f)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code have concentrated on the Radford case and have acted as though it were a
unique and isolated example of debtor-creditor law. In fact, it was
an embellishment of the traditional stay law concept, but at a federal level. Radford construed the first Frazier-Lemke Act, which
was common place in the sense that it was a stay law. It was
unique in the sense that this was the first federal venture into this
particular arena and in the sense that the restrictive authority created for an emergency was not limited to the duration of the emergency. Because the Frazier-Lemke Act was a reflection of the Great
Depression, 4' an examination of the background of the period will
reveal the purpose and nature of the act.
At the producer level, American food prices reached their peak
in 1917 as the United States was entering World War I and helping
to feed much of Europe, where farms had become battlefields. The
prices of farmland peaked at about the same time or slightly later.
By 1921-22 the first post-war recession occurred and was felt much
more strongly in the rural areas than in the cities, as both food
prices and farmland prices showed a considerable decline, later
learned to be a part of a fifteen-year trend. (The value of the Radford farm dropped from $18,000 in 1922 to $4,445 in 1934.) By the
1930's, the mortgage debt frequently would exceed the value of a
farm.
What was to prove particularly devastating to farmers in the
period from 1929 to 1934 was the fact that generally farm morgages had a five year maturity with no principal payments made in
the interim. Across the country, eighty-eight percent of farm mort138. REP. OF THE A1rr'y GEN. (1937-38).
139. See supra note 18.
140. See generally L. CHANDLER, AMERICA'S GREATEST DEPRESSION (1970); D.
SHERMAN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1960); Miller, After the Mortgage Moratorium-What? 19 IowA L. REv. 560 (1934).
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gages were for five years or less, which meant that most farm mortgages matured during the Depression. The practice had been for a
farmer to roll over his mortgage with the same mortgagee at a current interest rate, or refinance the mortgage. During the Depression most of the mortgagees were hard pressed themselves and not
in a position to refinance. Many banks and insurance companies
had failed,1 4 and their receivers were not renewing mortgages but
were dumping portfolio mortgages upon a saturated market. Other
non-liquid banks and insurance companies were doing the same,
either of their own volition or at the direction of regulatory
agencies.
Farm income in Iowa in 1932 was only thirty percent of what
it had been in 1929. It took 2.5 times as many bushels of corn to
meet a dollar obligation in 1932 as it had in 1929, and 2.7 times as
many bushels of wheat. Although values of farms declined substantially in Iowa from 1922 until 1930, real estate taxes doubled.
Twenty-five percent of all Iowa farm mortgages were foreclosed
during 1931-32. In 1932, seventy-seven percent of all farm mortgages in Oklahoma were in default. In early 1933, rioting occurred
in Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska and Wisconsin when courts
attempted to conduct foreclosure proceedings or when sheriffs
tried to hold foreclosure sales. One district court judge was beaten,
one sheriff was killed, and a number of sheriffs and deputies were
injured in this confrontation of property rights and human needs.
At various times it was necessary to call out the National Guard to
maintain the peace.
Oats sold for two cents per bushel, corn for eight cents, and
wheat for twenty-nine cents; hogs sold for two and one-half cents
per pound, eggs for seven cents per dozen, and butter for ten cents
per pound. The freight rates on lambs sent to Middle Western
packers ($1.10) were greater than the market prices paid for the
animals ($1.00). Western ranchers destroyed entire herds of sheep
because they could not afford to feed them, nor bear to see them
starve to death. Wheat was left standing in the fields of Montana
because it would cost more to harvest than it would bring at the
market. Similarly, fruit was left on the vines in California and on
the trees in Oregon and Washington because the cost of picking it
141. Of the 200 banks that had been doing business in Chicago on December
31, 1929, 155 had closed by December 31, 1932, and eight more were to fail before
the Bank Moratorium of March, 1933. A failure rate of 80% was not atypical. See
Merrick & Bufithis, Chapter XII- Why is it? 52 Am. BANKR. L.J. 213, 236 (1978).
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exceeded its market value. The farmers felt forsaken. They were
prepared to roll over their mortgages as they had done in the past,
but the mortgagees refused to do so and demanded payment.
At least twenty-nine of the then forty-eight states enacted
moratory legislation which suspended farm mortgage foreclosures;
some for a maximum of two years, others for the lesser of two
years or the duration of the emergency. 4 2 It appears that Congress
also wished to pass a statute which would suspend farm mortgage
foreclosures on a national basis, but that was not one of its enumerated powers and thus was prohibited by the reserved powers
clause. 143 For that reason the federal stay law was treated as auxiliary to the Bankruptcy Act and was appended to section 75 as a
new subsection (s), known as the Frazier-Lemke Act.144
Before discussing Radford-which the proponents of the unconstitutionality of section 522(f)(2)(A) say remains unimpaired
and the opponents say has been diluted-it may be in order to
point out that the proponents and opponents are like two persons
looking at the same object from opposite ends of a telescope. What
is seen is different because the perspectives are different.
Radford was decided under the eminent domain clause of the
fifth amendment. As eminent domain authority its force has not
been reduced, and it was cited with approval in an eminent domain context in Armstrong v. United States.1'" Other cases considering Frazier-Lemke14' have used as their yardstick the clause of
the fifth amendment which declares: "No person shall . . . be deprived of. . . property, without due process of law. ....,47
The latter cases have concentrated upon the objectives of Congress and whether the method chosen to delay foreclosure was
142. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Vir-

ginia, Wisconsin, and possibly others. See Note, Due Process of Law, Moratoria
Acts, 9 NOTRE DAME LAW. 328 (1934).
143.
144.
145.
146.

See
See
364
See

U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also supra note 113.
supra note 18.
U.S. 40 (1960).
Wright v. Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke,

300 U.S. 440 (1937). See also Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273,
278 (1940); Borchard v. California Bank, 310 U.S. 311, 317 (1940); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940); John Hancock Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180, 187
(1939); Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1937).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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reasonable. There appears to be no question that, as a method of
gauging constitutionality, the eminent domain approach of Radford has been abandoned. In fact, it was abandoned by Mr. Justice
Brandeis, who wrote Radford, and who also wrote Wright v.
Vinton Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke. 4 8 Another factor to be borne in mind is that the cases subsequent to
Radford not only were using a different constitutional standard,
they also were construing a much less extreme statute, the second
Frazier-Lemke Act which was limited to the contemporaneous
emergency. One would anticipate more temperate language by the
Court when the statute under analysis is more restrained.
LOUISVILLE JOINT STOCK LAND BANK V. RADFORD

Before considering the Radford case itself, three Supreme
Court cases1 49 will be discussed which were decided less than one
year before Radford and which dealt with moratory legislation enacted by states. Although the Court analyzed these state laws in
terms of the contract clause, the language of the decisions and the
result accomplished were as though the legislation was being scrutinized under the fourteenth amendment. While there were especial circumstances applicable to Radford which caused it to be considered under the eminent domain power, most of the cases which
preceded and followed Radford (whether considering state statutes
or federal statutes, and regardless of the precise issue raised upon
appeal) give every appearance of actually having been reasoned
under either the fifth or fourteenth amendments.
Two statutes passed by the Arkansas legislature in March,
1933, demonstrate the fear which characterized rural America at
the time. In W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas,50 the Supreme Court
considered an act which provided that a broad class of insurance
proceeds could not be seized for the payment of debts of Arkansas
residents. 1 ' A writ of garnishment had been served March 10,
148. 300 U.S. 440 (1937).

149. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); W. B.
Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935); W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas,
292 U.S. 426 (1934).

150. 292 U.S. 426, 430 (1934).
151. Id. at 429-30 (quoting 1933 Ark. Acts 102):
[A]ll moneys paid or payable to any resident of this state as the insured

or beneficiary designated under any insurance policy or policies providing for the payment of life, sick, accident and/or disability benefits shall

be exempt from liability or seizure under judicial process of any court,
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1933, on the insurer of the deceased husband of a widow against
whom a judgment for rent had been obtained. The act in question
was passed March 15, 1933. The Supreme Court made several important points:
1. There had been no prior statute imposing restrictions on
the use of insurance proceeds;
2. The act in question had no limitations-no limitation as
to amount; no limitation as to beneficiary if residents; no
limitation as to circumstances;
3. The legislature used the existing emergency to justify the
exemption, but it did not limit the relief to the duration of
the emergency. "
W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kavanaugh," the other Arkansas legislation construction case, arose out of an action to enforce real
property assessments made in connection with street improvements, and to permit payment of bonds issued July 1, 1930.154 The
and shall not be subjected to the payment of any debt by contract or
otherwise ....
152. In describing its own action in supporting Minnesota stay legislation in
Blaisdell, the Court stated,
We said . . . that the State's protective power could not be said to be
non-existent when the urgent public need demanding relief was produced
by other than economic causes .... We held that when the exercise of
the reserved power of the State, in order to meet public need because of
a pressing public disaster, relates to the enforcement of existing contracts, that action must be limited by reasonable conditions appropriate
to the emergency. This is but the application of the familiar principle
that the relief afforded must have reasonable relation to the legitimate
end to which the State is entitled to direct its legislation.
292 U.S. at 433.
153. 295 U.S. 56, 60-62 (1935).
154. Several acts passed in March, 1933, had made these changes:
1. time for payment of assessment enlarged from 30 days to 90 days;
2. penalty for late payment reduced from 20 to 3%;
3. return of delinquent list (formerly required immediately) extended to 90 days;
4. appearance and answer date extended from 5 to 90 days;
5. answer after constructive service extended from 15 days to 6
months, with another 6 months before trial;
6. time for payment after decree extended from 10 days to 12
months, with an additional 6 months before property could be sold;
7. fees and costs prohibited;
8. provision for expedited appeals repealed;
9. repealed right of purchaser to take possession during the redemption period, which was extended to 4 years.
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Court's statement that "the framers of the amendments have put
restraint aside," demonstrates its distaste for such one-sided
legislation. "
Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell,5 6 which
preceded these two Arkansas legislation construction cases, is a
truly delightful case from a judicial perspective, and it set the pattern which was to be followed in the construction of much of the
New Deal legislation. In a five to four decision Chief Justice
Hughes, writing for the majority in support of a dynamic Constitution, stated: "While emergency does not create power,
emergency
''15
may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power. 7
In his dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Sutherland wrote with
equal force for a static Constitution: "A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two distinctly
opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time
and an entirely different thing at another time.'"5
The statute at issue was the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium
Law. Although it was designed to assist farmers, it was of general
application. The mortgagor, Blaisdell, owned a residence in Minneapolis which had been sold at foreclosure sale to the mortgagee on
May 2, 1932; the period of redemption was to expire May 2, 1933.
The Act was approved April 18, 1933 and was to remain in effect
"only during the continuance of the emergency and in no event
See 1933 Ark. Acts 102.
155. A catalogue of the changes imposed upon this mortgage must lead
to the conviction that the framers of the amendments have put restraint
aside. With studied indifference to the interests of the mortgagee or to
his appropriate protection they have taken from the mortgage the quality of an acceptable investment for a rational investor ....
Relief is not
conditioned upon payment of interest and taxes or the rental value of the
premises. The case is one of postponement for a term of many years with
undisturbed possession for the debtor and without a dollar for the creditor. There is not even a requirement that the debtor shall satisfy the
court of his ability to pay ....

295 U.S. at 60.
The changes of remedy now challenged as invalid are to be viewed in
combination with the cumulative significance that each imparts to all. So
viewed, they are seen to be an oppressive and unnecessary destruction of
nearly all the incidents that give attractiveness and value to collateral
security.
Id. at 62.
156. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
157. Id. at 426.
158. Id. at 448 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).

[1982:1671

CONSTITUTIONAL CHAOS

beyond May 1, 1935. '' 1581

No combination of continuances and

stays could have the effect of extending the law beyond that date.
Meanwhile (1) the court was required to determine a reasonable
income or rental to be used by the mortgagor in possession during
the redemption period for the payment of taxes, insurance, interest, and mortgage debt as determined by the court, and (2) no action could be maintained on a deficiency judgment until the end of
the redemption period.
In quoting from Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, the Blaisdell
Court included a 100 year-old principle by-passed by Rodrock and
Gifford:
It is competent for the States to change the form of the remedy,
or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit, provided no substantial right secured by the contract is thereby impaired. No

attempt has been made to fix definitely the line between alterations of the remedy, which are to be deemed legitimate, and those

which under the form of modifying the remedy, impair substantial rights."

The Court also stressed another bedrock principle ignored by
the Rodrock and Gifford Courts, quoting Chief Justice Waite: "In
all such cases the question becomes, therefore, one of reasonableness, and of that the legislature is primarily the judge."160
All three of the state statutes discussed were enacted in March
and April, 1933. Also passed in March, 1933, was an amendment
which added to the Bankruptcy Act section 74, providing for compositions and extensions for individuals and partnerships; section
158.1. 1933 Minn. Laws ch. 339.

159. 290 U.S. at 430 (quoting Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4

Wall.) 535, 553-54 (1866) (emphasis added).
160. 290 U.S. at 430-31
(1882)). The Blaisdell Court
It is manifest from this
growing appreciation of

(quoting Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775
summarized its philosophy by stating:
review of our decisions that there has been a
public needs and of the necessity of finding

ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public
welfare.
We are of the opinion that the Minnesota statute as here applied

does not violate the contract clause of the Federal Constitution. Whether
the legislation is wise or unwise as a matter of policy is a question with
which we are not concerned.

What has been said on that point is also applicable to the contention
presented under the due process clause.
290 U.S. 442, 447-48.
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75, providing for compositions and extensions for farmers; and section 77, providing for the reorganization of railroads engaged in interstate commerce. 1' Section 75 failed to carry out its legislative
purpose. The mechanics of that section made it extremely ponderous and almost unworkable; the substance of it foredoomed any
chance of success. In order for a farmer to effectuate a composition
plan under section 75 it was necessary to obtain the consent of a
majority of his creditors in number and dollar amount. Most of the
farmers had real estate mortgages, the owners of which held a majority in amount of the debt. Because of their own pressing
financial problems, mortgagees without an ancillary security interest in growing crops were not extending maturities, refinancing or
making new loans. Insurance companies, which were the largest
6
holders of farm debt, had stopped making mortgage loans. 2
Because section 75 was not working, it was amended the following year by the addition of a subsection (s) which did not require the consent of the creditors; section 75(s) was not a composition but an adjudication in bankruptcy. 0 8 The original subsection
(s) was held unconstitutional in Radford and almost immediately
replaced by an amended subsection (s) which was considered in a
number of other Supreme Court cases. 164 The facts in most of
these cases are fundamentally similar.
As a factual composite, a farmer during the 1920's placed a
mortgage on his farm and defaulted in the early 1930's. The mortgagee instituted foreclosure proceedings, and prior to the expiration of the redemption period, section 75 was enacted. The mortgagor then filed a petition for a composition under section 75 and the
mortgagee, holding a majority in amount of the debt, refused to
consent. Thereafter, the mortgagor filed under section 75(s) and
was adjudged a bankrupt.
Radford held the first Frazier-Lemke Act unconstitutional; 1O"
the other cases held the second Frazier-Lemke Act constitutional.1 66 The subsequent cases do not demonstrate a marked
161. See Act of March 3, 1933, Pub. L. No. 72-420, 47 Stat. 1467. See also
supra text accompanying notes 97, 131 & 137.
162. See supra note 140-41 and accompanying text.
163. See Frazier-Lemke Act of 1934, ch. 869, Pub. L. No. 73-486, 48 Stat.

1289.
164. See cases cited supra note 146.
165. 295 U.S. at 601-02.
166. See cases cited supra note 146. See also Frazier-Lemke Act of 1935, ch.
792, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49 Stat. 492.
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change of approach by the Supreme Court on the core issue; rather
they show a considerably changed statute. It is submitted that an
astute reader of the two Worthen cases67 and Blaisdell s could
have predicted in advance the outcome in all of the section 75(s)
cases under either statute.
One objection of the Radford Court to section 75(s) was that
for five years the mortgagee was relatively powerless to protect
himself because for that period the bankrupt had an option to
purchase the property, but he did not have a reciprocal obligation
to maintain it. The only point at which the mortgagee could seek a
reappraisal was at a time which the bankrupt selected in making
his purchase.
The Court found that five property rights had been taken
from the mortgagee. 169 The apex of its reasoning was that "[t]he
Frazier-Lemke Act does not purport to exercise the right of eminent domain . . . . If the public interest requires, and permits,
the taking of property of individual mortgagees in order to relieve
the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings of eminent domain ... .11171
The Court in Radford recognized the immensity of the problem: that it was not dealing with an isolated dispute between a
mortgagee and a mortgagor, but with a national crisis of agrarian
unrest at times approaching anarchy. The Court suggested that the
appropriate solution was payment to the mortgagees by the government; and that, in effect, was the way that the problem did become resolved. The solution to the farm mortgage problem was the
167. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
168. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See supra text accompanying note 156.
169. 1. The right to retain the lien until the indebtedness thereby secured is paid.
2. The right to realize upon the security by a judicial public sale.
3. The right to determine when such sale shall be held, subject only
to the discretion of the court.
4. The right to protect its interest in the property by bidding at such
sale whenever held, and thus to assure having the mortgaged property
devoted primarily to the satisfaction of the debt, either through receipt
of the proceeds of a fair competitive sale or by taking the property itself.
5. The right to control meanwhile the property during the period of
default, subject only to the discretion of the court, and to have the rents
and profits collected by a receiver for the satisfaction of the debt.
295 U.S. 555, 594-95.
170. Id. at 596.
171. Id. at 602.
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infusion of billions of dollars of federal money into the farm mortgage market by direct and indirect participations of government
agencies, principally under the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of
May 12, 1933,172 and the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation Act
of January 31, 1934.173 These Acts provided the farmers an economical method of refinancing their defaulted mortgages without
having to give up their farms.
The Radford Court had questioned, but did not meet head on,
the extent of protection required by the Constitution to be given to
a secured creditor. 17 ' It is at this point that Rodrock 73 was to
stumble so badly near fifty years later. Rodrock did not limit itself
to "rights in specific property which are of substantial value" nor
cite this as the holding of Radford. Rather, the court rewrote Radford for its own purposes. The Tenth Circuit stated, "[U]nder
Radford, these vested rights cannot be taken from the creditor for
the benefit of the debtor . . . . [T]he fundamental teaching of
Radford [is] that Congress may not under the bankruptcy power
completely take for the benefit of a debtor rights in specific property previously acquired by a creditor. ' 1 7 As will be detailed below, the property in Rodrock not only did not have proven value, it
presumptively did not have any value at all.
Immediately after the Supreme Court found the first FrazierLemke Act to be unconstitutional in Radford, Congress redrafted
the Act using the Court decision as a blueprint and within eight
months passed a second Frazier-Lemke Act. 1 7 When called upon
to consider the constitutionality of this new version in Wright v.
172. The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of May 12, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10,

48 Stat. 31.
173. The Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation Act of Jan. 31, 1934, Pub. L.
No. 73-88, 48 Stat. 344.

174. Radford contends that these changes in the position of the Bank

... do not impair substantive rights, because the Bank retains every
right in the property to which it is entitled. The contention rests upon

the unfounded assertion that its only substantive right under the mort-

gage is to have the value of the security applied to the satisfaction of a
debt.
295 U.S. at 596.
The issue for decision by the Court was stated: "The province of the Court is

limited to deciding whether the Frazier-Lemke Act as applied has taken from the
Bank without compensation, and given to Radford, rights in specific property
which are of substantial value." Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
175. Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981).
176. Id. at 1197-98.

177. See supra note 18.
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Vinton Branch, the Supreme Court reviewed the five grounds
upon which it had held the first Frazier-Lemke Act to be unconstitutional and found that all of the constitutional defects had been
corrected.""8
178. 300 U.S. 440 (1937).
The previous finding in Radford that under the first Frazier-Lemke Act there
had been an abridgement of "[the right to retain the lien until the indebtedness
thereby secured is paid[,]" (295 U.S. at 594), had been satisfied by provisions in
the second act that the debtor's possession "under the supervision and control of
the Court" was "subject to all existing mortgages, liens, pledges, or encumbrances" which "shall remain in full force and effect" and the property covered by
them "shall be subject to the payment of the claims of the secured creditors, as
their interests may appear." 300 U.S. at 458 (quoting the Frazier-Lemke Act of
1935).
The second Radford objection had been that the sale to the debtor at an
appraised value infringed the mortgagee's "right to realize upon the security by a
judicial public sale." 295 U.S. at 594. The Vinton Branch Court was satisfied with
the provision that "upon request in writing by any secured creditor or creditors,
the court shall order the property upon which such secured creditors have a lien
to be sold at public auction." 300 U.S. at 459 (quoting the Frazier-Lemke Act of
1935.) There is no way of knowing whether the Court would have been satisfied
had it suspected that the second Union Central case (311 U.S. 273 (1940)), would
hold that this right to bid in at an auction sale was not available to the mortgagee
until after the mortgagor had had an opportunity to purchase the property at its
appraised value within three years.
The third Radford objection had been that the five year option period available to the mortgagor deprived the mortgagee of the ability to determine the timing of the sale. 295 U.S. at 594. The revised subsection (s) reduced that period to
three years; and, in addition, the period no longer was absolute, as the court could
order a sale earlier, or could appoint a trustee. The more temperate tone of the
decision can be seen from the following:
If we were in doubt as to the intention of Congress, we should still be led
to that construction by a well settled rule: 'When the validity of an act of
the Congress is drawn into question, and even if a serious doubt of the
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will
first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.'
300 U.S. at 461 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
The fourth of the Radford objections had been that the mortgagee did not
have a right to protect its interest by bidding in its mortgage. 295 U.S. at 594-95.
The language of the revised statute did not spell out that right, but the court
demonstrated its more conciliatory approach: "But the committee reports and explanations given in Congress make it plain that the mortgagee was intended to
have his right. We accept this view of the statute." 300 U.S. at 459 (footnote
omitted).
The fifth Radford objection had been that its mortgagee had been deprived
of the right to control the property, subject only to the discretion of the courts,
and to have the rents and profits collected by a receiver for the satisfaction of the
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The Court also pointed out that paragraph six of the new subsection (s) declared the act to be an emergency measure and provided that: "[I]f in the judgment of the court such emergency
ceases to exist in its locality, then the court, in its discretion, may
shorten the stay of proceedings ....*" The Court discussed and
answered obliquely a number of other objections to the revised
subsection (s). "The question which the objections raise is not
whether the Act does more than modify remedial rights. It is
whether the legislation modifies the secured creditor's rights, remedial or substantive, to such an extent as to deny the due process of
law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment."180
Other constitutional issues raised by the second FrazierLemke Act were disposed of in later cases. The first case of Wright
v. Union Central Life Insurance Co.,'" is complicated factually

because it deals with two separate inter-family transactions which
occurred almost simultaneously. In substance, Blackacre was conveyed to Wright during the redemption period following a foreclosure but at a time when no section 75(s) was operative. Whiteacre
also was conveyed to Wright during its redemption period while
the second section 75(s) was in effect. The Court held that the applicable measuring date was the date that the bankrupt filed his
section 75(s) petition, and not when the original section 75 petition
had been filed. Consequently, Whiteacre gained the protection of
the second Frazier-Lemke Act.18 2 There is a significant difference

debt. 295 U.S. at 595. In Vinton Branch, the Court reasoned that this was not a
detriment because the mortgagor knew the property and could administer it better and more cheaply than a mortgagee or a receiver. Additionally, the mortgagor
was charged with the obligations imposed for the benefit of the mortgagee as fully
as a trustee or receiver would have been; and the mortgagor was always under the
supervision of the court. 300 U.S. at 466. There can be no question that the Court
was impressed by the efforts of Congress to meet, the objections of the Court as
expressed in Radford.
179. 300 U.S. at 463 (quoting § 75(s)(6)).
180. 300 U.S. at 470.
181. 304 U.S. 502 (1938).
182. The first transaction related to an 80.31 acre tract (Blackacre) which
was deeded by Wright to his son in 1931, subject to a mortgage which Wright had
taken out in 1925. On January 3, 1934, a suit to foreclose was filed, followed by a
judgment on June 9, 1934, and sale on July 12, 1934. The one year period of
redemption ended July 12, 1935, under Indiana law. A sheriff's deed was executed
August 2, 1935; on April 13, 1935, the son had quit-claimed Blackacre back to his
father.
The second tract was 120 acres in three 40 acre parcels (Whiteacre), which
were conveyed by Wright to his wife, daughter and son-in-law respectively, also in
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in tone between the first Union Central case and Radford: "The
development of bankruptcy legislation has been toward relieving
the honest debtor from oppressive indebtedness and permitting
him to start afresh . .. ..1

John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bartels184 came

before the Court the following year. The district court had dismissed the petition on the ground that the debtor did not have any
equity in the property which could be the basis for a rehabilitation.
The Court reversed stating, "We are not here concerned with questions which may arise in the course of the administration under
the statute, but merely with the duty to follow the procedure
which the statute defines and the District Court failed to
observe."' 5
Kalb v. Feuerstein'8 was addressed by the Court in the same
year. It declared null and void under the supremacy clause a Wisconsin sheriff's sale after the filing of a composition petition under
section 75; the foreclosure proceeding had been instituted several
days after section 75 was enacted. Section 75(o)(2) expressly forbade institution or maintenance of foreclosures. The court noted
the breadth which Congress intended for the stay provisions of the
1931, and subject to a different mortgage. The grantees quit-claimed the property
back to Wright on April 13, 1935, the same date as the reconveyance of Blackacre.
A suit to foreclose Whiteacre was filed, and judgment and the decree of foreclosure entered May 27, 1935. The mortgagee purchased the property at a sheriff's
sale on July 20, 1935.
On October 29, 1934, Wright filed his § 75 composition, and, upon failing to
gain the consent of the mortgagee, filed a petition for adjudication under the first
§ 75(s) on December 19, 1934. On October 11, 1935, he filed his petition for adjudication under the revised § 75(s). The period of redemption on Blackacre ended
July 12, 1935, while there was no § 75(s) in effect. The period of redemption on
Whiteacre ended July 20, 1936, after the revised § 75(s) had become effective
(August 28, 1935).
Wright's original petition had scheduled Blackacre and Whiteacre, and the
line of cleavage was at what point should property of the estate be measured. The
Court held the appropriate date to be not the initial filing date under § 75, but
the date of filing the petition for adjudication under § 75(s), which was October
11, 1935. The redemption period respecting Blackacre had expired before the §
75(s) petition was filed; the redemption period respecting Whitacre ended after
the filing under the revised § 75(s) and consequently was subject to that act and
to § 75(n), which extended the redemption period further.
183. 304 U.S. 502, 514 (1938).
184. 308 U.S. 180 (1939).
185. Id. at 187.
186. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
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act.

Borchard v. California Bank 87 resulted from an appeal by a
farmer from an order of the district court permitting the mortgagee to foreclose on a deed in trust under state law prior to the
expiration of the three-year period in which the farmer had a right
to purchase at an appraised price under section 75(s). In holding
that procedure improper, the Court repeated, "As pointed out in
the Wright v. Vinton Branch case, the secured creditors' rights
are protected to the extent of the value of the property."188
The question of whether Radford has become diluted by subt
sequent Supreme Court decisions may be approached from several
directions. The rancor which seemed to surface in Radford was
greatly diluted in subsequent opinions dealing with the second
Frazier-Lemke Act. The Court appeared to appreciate the extent
to which Congress deferred to the expertise of the judiciary. The
tone of subsequent cases was considerably more conciliatory, in
part due, no doubt, to the fact that the emergency legislation was
limited to the duration of the emergency. Subsequent cases also
appeared to show a greater orientation toward the debtor and his
fresh start,1 89 while demonstrating a more humanitarian and less
materialistic insight.
Radford had catechized the sanctity of secured interests in
property without taking a positive position. The Borchardcase and
the second case of Wright v. Union Central Life Insurance Co.1 90
established firmly, definitely and (until Rodrock and Gifford) conclusively, the proposition that the limit of a security interest is the
value of the collateral. Those cases go very far also in saying that
policy decisions of the Congress should be followed as closely as
possible by the courts.
In summary, subsequent decisions have not diminished the
holding of Radford that it is a substantial property right which is
entitled to constitutional protection. Although Radford theorized
as to whether the property rights to be protected might be greater
than the value of the collateral, Borchard and the second Union
Central case established that it is only the value of the collateral
187. 310 U.S. 311 (1940).

188. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
189. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934), was one of a number of
cases beginning to focus on bankruptcy law from the viewpoint of the debtor. The
debtor's "fresh start" has been emphasized more recently. See United States v.
Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978); see also Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966).
190. 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
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which is entitled to constitutional protection.
On the narrow issue of what are the constitutional rights of a
secured creditor, Radford remains intact on the proposition that
the creditor may not be deprived of substantial rights in specific
property without due process of law. There has been a shift from
the eminent domain aspect of the fifth amendment to the due process aspect, and it has become established clearly, precisely and
unalterably that the value of the collateral, and only that, is entitled to protection. Peripheral rights which were discussed in the
enumeration of the five deficiencies of the first Frazier-Lemke Act
have been swept aside.
ECONOMICS OF HOUSEHOLD COLLATERAL

Virtually all of the decisions and articles which have dealt
with the issue of the constitutionality of lien avoidance of security
interests in household goods have done so at a highly technical
level and have given little or no thought to the actual dynamics of
the problem. The judges and the commentators probably never
have seen furniture as dilapidated as that which normally is the
subject of the lien avoidance proceedings. The judges are inclined
to think in terms of their own furniture, what it costs, and the care
which their families have given to it.
By definition, the goods which are the subject matter of section 522(f)(2)(A) are not purchase-money goods. This means that
almost all of them were either acquired by the present debtor second-hand, or acquired on a purchase-money arrangement which
has been superseded directly or indirectly by the present financing
arrangement. Under either circumstance, the goods had received
considerable use before they were given as collateral for the loan in
question.
Almost no analyst, whether judge or commentator, has paid
any attention to the relevant value of the household goods, that is,
the value to the secured creditor at an auction market. Occasionally there have been stipulations as to the value of the household
goods at the residence of the debtor, but this is not meaningful to
the creditor because he ordinarily cannot hold a sale there although the Uniform Commercial Code permits disposal on the
debtor's premises in limited circumstances. 191 The market value of
the goods is their value at the market place, and the cost of moving
them to that place represents an enhancement to their prior value.
191. U.C.C. § 9-503 & comment.
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In almost every circumstance a repossession of the goods by the
secured creditor will entail the use of a truck and a crew of men for
about one-half day. That expense should be deducted from the initial appraised value in determining the pertinent commercial
value.
Under the Uniform Commercial Code a secured creditor holding household goods as collateral has his hands tied because if he
takes possession of the goods he must dispose of them in a "commercially reasonable" manner, 19" which for' practical purposes
means an auction sale. The creditor must advertise the sale, give
notice to the debtor, conduct the sale, and keep records from
which can be computed the amount of a deficiency as well as
whether the sale was "commercially reasonable." The risks of penalty are so high to the creditor that as a practical matter the creditor very rarely repossesses the goods. Because of the risks involved,
the goods have a negative value to the creditor. 193
Not only must the creditor maintain records to satisfy the
debtor in the event of a repossession, frequently he also has to
maintain records and submit reports to a state regulatory commission. A report of that nature showed that in Illinois in the year
1979, there were only twenty-five repossessions of household goods
out of 31,201 defaults.19 ' Such reports are not broken down between purchase-money and nonpurchase-money security interests;
and it is reasonable to presume that most, if not all, of the collateral security repossessed represented purchase-money collateral.
Even so, the gross aggregate salvage to the creditor averaged only
$390 per default. No figures were given respecting the cost of repossession and sale, but at current rates, the probable cost of use
of a truck and a crew would have equalled the sales proceeds.
There are two fundamental reasons that creditors normally do
not repossess nonpurchase-money household goods collateral. The
first is that it is worth nothing to the creditor after he deducts his
expense of selling it, and the second is that he has been hand-cuffed by the Uniform Commercial Code. For either or both of these
reasons the collateral, as collateral, has no value. Gifford asserts
that the collateral has value as an instrument of coercion and that
192. Id. at § 9-504(3).
193. The Uniform Commercial Code was applicable to both Rodrock (Colorado) and Gifford (Wisconsin). COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 4-9-101 to 9-507 (1976); Wis.
STAT. ANN. §§ 409.101-409.507 (West 1973). See U.C.C. § 9-504 for secured party's
rights and obligations.
194. 1980 ILL. DEP'T FIN. INST. 47.
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the coercive value is entitled to constitutional protection. 195
That subject has been addressed by the Supreme Court on
several occasions, not as an interpretation of the fifth amendment
but under the contract clause. In both Beers v. Haughton'" and
Penniman's Case,19 7 the state insolvency law governing release
from debtors prison was modified during a period of imprisonment.
The creditors argued unsuccessfully that the change in the law was
an impairment of their respective contracts and consequently unconstitutional. The Court held that imprisonment was a part of the
creditor's remedy and not a constitutional right. Here, similarly,
the ability to coerce should be considered a part of the creditor's
remedy which has been abrogated.
One of the curious aspects of Gifford is that courts of equity
traditionally have been opposed to penalties, forefeitures and coercion; and after seven centuries of development in that direction,
Gifford takes the position that an ability to coerce not only is an
enforceable right but also a right entitled to constitutional
protection.1s
An argument can be made that electrical appliances will have
a higher used value than will furniture, and to a degree this is correct. It should be borne in mind, however, that electrical appliances in the hands of some debtors will be subjected to the same
kind of abuse and overuse as will their furniture.
Even though the values of electrical appliances might be somewhat higher than the values of furniture, statistics indicate that
the values still are not high enough to cause the secured creditors
to have any interest in repossessing them. 1 " To do so may take a
195. "Congress found that although the resale value of such household goods
is negligible, their replacement cost is high. The lien's primary value to the creditor is thus a threat, used to coerce debtors into making payments they cannot
afford in order to retain their basic necessities." 669 F.2d at 472.
196. 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 329 (1835).
197. 103 U.S. 714 (1880).
198. 669 F.2d at 472-73.
199. The use of security interests in consumer goods was discussed by an
attorney of the Division of Special Projects, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission.
One of the most important and widely abused devices available to the
large credit institution is a blanket security interest in household necessities. As a practical matter our files reflect that household goods are rarely
seized .... Household goods have little or no direct economic value in
the resale market ....
The blanket security interest in household goods, combined with the
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larger truck or larger crew of men. Sales are more expensive to
conduct because a prospective purchaser will want to test an electrical appliance. A debtor may not feel a proprietary interest in his
encumbered appliances nor care to invest his own money in repairing an appliance which he considers belongs to the finance com-

pany. As a consequence, the appliance will be run until it fails

completely; at no point in its life cycle as collateral can there be a
presumption that it is in good operating condition.
Under the Bankruptcy Act there was a provision (section
17a(2)) that caused to be non-dischargeable, debts which were incurred through a fraudulent misrepresentation upon which the

creditor had relied. This concept has been substantively retained

under the Bankruptcy Code (section 523(c)(2)). There was testimony before the Bankruptcy Commission and Congressional Committees that finance companies had adopted two practices, either

of which could present dischargeability problems to the debtor in
the event of bankruptcy:
1. at the time of the loan application the debtor would be

told to list several of his principal debts on his loan application, under which there would appear above his signature
the legend, "THESE ARE ALL OF My DEBTS," and
2. the debtor would list the household goods which were to
be the subject of a security interest, followed by specific

related boiler-plate of statutory exemptions has at least three uses. It is
an effective lever for securing refinancings at appropriate stages of the
economic cycle. It is used occasionally for limited economic recovery by
actual seizure of the property. Finally, a blanket lien on household goods
is among the most effective levers available for securing an anticipatory
reaffirmation of a debt which is otherwise dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Based on the cases we examined in our investigation, and on the
findings and recommendations prepared by the National Commission on
Consumer Finance, we believe that there is no justification whatsoever
for the common practice of requiring debtors to pledge all of their household property to small lenders. . . . We can conceive of few practices in
today's consumer market which are more debilitating and demoralizing
than the repeated threat to seize the household necessities of an insolvent and his family, items which as a practical matter, have little if any
economic value to the creditor. These kinds of threats do not enhance
the economic situation of either party. They subvert the specific policy
which underpins personal bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy Act Revisions: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the
House of Rep., 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 761-62 (1975) (statement of David H.
Williams).
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itemized dollar values.
The debtor frequently was told by the finance company that the
loan was more likely to receive committee approval if the debts
were understated and the values were overstated.
After a bankruptcy proceeding had been filed, it was a relatively easy matter for the finance company to persuade the debtor
to reaffirm his debt in order to retain his household goods, and to
.
avoid having a non-dischargeable debt.200

The debtors frequently were no better able to pay high
monthly finance charges after bankruptcy than they were before
and thus became subject to garnishment or wage-assignment proceedings after defaulting on their reaffirmation agreements. The
primary goal of the Bankruptcy Commission had been to eliminate
such repetitions by structuring the Bankruptcy Code in such a way
that unsophisticated debtors might be protected from their own

ignorance and the sharp practices of installment lenders. 0 1 The

Bankruptcy Commission proposed two drastic changes to provide
the protection which it believed the debtors required: debts would
be extinguished by bankruptcy, not just discharged; and a
financial counselling service would be a part of the bankruptcy

200. The Bankruptcy Commission found that even after discharge consumer
lenders would "continue to make advantageous use of the financial statements
obtained at the time of extending credit by filing or threatening to file applications for determination of non-dischargeability against bankrupts and accepting
reaffirmation in settlement of the litigation or threatened litigation." CoMMIssION
REPORT, supra note 11, at 11.

201. Under the present Act, creditors are able to frustrate the discharge
by obtaining reaffirmations. Often reaffirmations are obtained by improper means, such as peer pressure, threat of criminal prosecution, and
employer coercion. The Commission is of the opinion that the goal of
rehabilitation should not be so easily frustrated. Therefore, the Commission recommends that reaffirmations not be enforceable and that the
bankruptcy court be given jurisdiction of all disputes concerning the
discharge.
Id. at 169.
The reaffirmation of agreements to pay debts, as distinguished from voluntary repayment of their debts, should be prohibited, and creditors
should be restrained from interfering with the performance of a payment
plan.
Id. at 11-12.
The Commission is also of the opinion that nonpurchase-money security
interests.should not be enforceable as to items of property essential to a
debtor's well-being, such as wearing apparel, which are of little or no
value to a creditor, other than as a means of coercing payment.
Id. at 80.
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process. 02
Discharge of debts in bankruptcy did not completely remove
the burden from the debtor. Under the Anglo-American concept of
discharge, a debt continues but is no longer enforceable and consequently the discharged debt can serve as consideration for a reaffirmation. An extinguishment of the debt would leave nothing
which could serve as consideration for a reaffirmation, and it was
reaffirmations which the Commission concluded were the underlying cause of repetitive personal financial problems. 03
Congress did not adopt the form of either of the Commission
proposals, but it went a considerable distance in incorporating the
substance of them by providing that a reaffirmation agreement
should not be enforceable unless:
(1) it was entered prior to the discharge,"" and
(2) it was approved by the court as not imposing an undue
hardship upon the debtor and being in his best interest. 05
Congress contemplated that the reaffirmed debt would not exceed the value of the collateral, and that the court would satisfy
itself of the debtor's ability to maintain payments. Congress also
provided a safety valve in that a reaffirmation in excess of the
value of the collateral might be approved in settlement of litigation.' ° Some finance companies appear to be taking advantage of
this by filing nondischargeability proceedings with a view of obtaining a reaffirmation by way of settlement under circumstances
where the value of the collateral would not have supported a reaffirmation otherwise.
As section 522(f) was being drafted, it probably was the
thought of Congress that the exemption allowed would be limited
to $200 per item because that was the exemption format discussed
during most of the hearing process.2 7 At the end of the deliberations, however, the $7500 exemption originally intended for homestead purposes was extended to cover other property, as well, and
acquired the nickname "wild card" exemption.20 8 This raises the
202. Id. at 122, 177.
203. Id. at 177.
204. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1).
205. Id. § 524(c)(4)(A)(i), (ii).
206. Id. § 524(c)(4)(B)(i), (ii).
207. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361-62 (1977). See 11 U.S.C. §
522(d)(3).
208. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). The $7500 "wild card" is added to a $400 blanket
exemption of § 522(d)(4).
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spectre of a debtor's avoiding a $7900 security interest in a specific
piece of antique furniture. The likelihood that such an event will
occur is extremely small because persons who own expensive furniture do not use it as collateral for loans. To the extent that they
borrow on a secured basis they use stocks, bonds or real estate as
collateral but not household furniture.

At the time of the Congressional hearings, representatives of

the consumer finance industry appeared and did not voice any objection to a proposal that reaffirmations not be permitted where
the collateral consisted of nonpurchase-money consumer goods.2 0 '

One may ask why it is that the industry now objects, to which the
only logical answer appears to be that the finance companies recognize that non-enforceable reaffirmation agreements may be entered
based upon the prior loan agreement. The finance companies recognize also that the unsophisticated debtors will not realize that
the reaffirmation agreements are invalid and so will honor them.
By denying lien avoidance the courts are permitting the establishing of a relationship which Congress strenuously attempted to prevent, based upon a discharged debtor's belief that he is obligated
legally to make payment on a debt which in fact has been discharged in order to retain household goods of little or no value to
anybody else.

209. With respect to redemptions under § 4-504 of H.R. 31, the representative of the American Bankers Association and the Consumer Bankers Association
Task Force on Bankruptcy stated, "We would support this Section if purchase
money obligations were excluded from its operation." COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 11, at 1025 (statement of Walter W. Vaughan).
That the household goods have little value was conceded by the prepared
statement of the leading proponent of the consumer finance companies, Alvin 0.
Wiese, Jr., Chairman of the National Consumer Financial Association Subcommittee on Bankruptcy.
Section 522(e) allows the debtor to avoid a non-purchase money security
interest in household furnishings, household goods, and other personal
property to the extent that the lien impairs an exemption in such property. This provision is apparently designed to help debtors retain possession of items bearing greater sentimental (personal) value than a great
deal of monetary value in the market place, but it does have a substantial value to both the creditor and the consumer as security has a recognizable psychological value. Both the consumer and the creditor realize
the property does not have the same value as when it was new, and that
it has a high replacement cost for the consumer.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in JudicialMachinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 651 (1977) (statement of Alvin 0. Weise, Jr.).
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Separately, commercial values of items seldom will be more
than $200 after deducting expenses of repossession and sale. But,
what if-? The courts probably never will be faced with a high
exemption situation and will serve justice better if they confine
themselves to specifics before them and do not attempt to imagine
complex problems; dealing with the facts before them entails ascertaining the commercial value of the goods at issue.
In re Pillow2 10 gained considerable notoriety because it collected and reviewed most of the section 522(f)(2)(A) cases which
had arisen at that time. In upholding the constitutionality of that
subsection, it makes an argument that lien avoidance is nothing
new and has considerable historical precedent. The statement happens to be true, but it has no relation to the issue before that court
or any other court considering section 522(f)(2)(A). Bankruptcy
law in the old sense was creditor versus creditor law; all of the
creditors were to share proportionately. Liens which would have
given one creditor a prior position sometimes were disregarded;
creditor diligence and collusion were negated by requiring a return
of the premature payments. Trustees appointed on behalf of creditors were themselves granted theoretical lien rights or given the
power to recover preferential payments. All of these things were
done in a bankruptcy context to promote equality among creditors.
All of the examples cited by Judge Mabey were instances in which
the lien avoidance had been for the benefit of creditors.
What section 522(f)(2)(A) does is different, it is new, and it
has nothing to do with lien avoidance by or on behalf of creditors.
It represents a debtor versus creditor confrontation, whereas the
cited cases represented creditor versus creditor contests. Section
522(f)(2)(A) is a method by which a debtor avoids a lien. Procedurally the methods by which a debtor avoids a lien are not particularly different from the methods by which a creditor, or his representative, avoids a lien. Substantively, they are a world apart. The
former has existed for 440 years; the later for two. The former is
taking from one member of a creditor group and distributing
among all of the members of the group. The latter is taking from a
creditor and giving to his opposite, the debtor.
The due process considerations are entirely different between
lien avoidance to benefit creditors and to benefit a debtor. In the
former the concept is that one creditor, by collusion, favoritism, or
diligence has gained an advantage over his peers and should be
210. 8 Bankr. 404, 421-24 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981).
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compelled to share with them on an equitable basis. There is no
dollar limit to the amount'which may be required to be returned to
the estate for proportionate distribution. (The principles respecting avoidance of preferences is the same as the principle of avoiding judicial and unperfected liens). There is a precise and dollar
limit to the amount by which a debtor may benefit from lien avoidance; it is the amount of his exemption.
Although new, lien avoidance on the part of debtor under section 522(f)(2)(A) need not, and usually does not, present a constitutional problem based upon due process because the lien has only
a nominal value, or none whatsoever. The creditor is not being deprived of anything so that the second step is not reached as to
whether there was a deprivation without due process of law.
The bankruptcy legislation of the 1930's presents an excellent
example of the broad tolerance given to the practice of depriving
an individual creditor of certain of his rights for the benefit of his
fellow creditors. Prior to the 1930's the federal equity rules had, as
a practical matter, given minority creditors a veto power over reorganizations. The bankruptcy reorganization legislation of the
1930's changed all of that and gave control to the majorities of
creditors by classes.' 11 Individual creditors were deprived of property rights at every turn; but the deprivation was to majorities
composed of those in similar circumstances, and the methods were
reasonable and included notice, a right to be heard and a right to
vote.
That is not the issue presented by section 522(f)(2)(A), and
those precedents of creditor versus creditor law have no bearing.
Congress has taken a new policy position respecting debtor-creditor relations, just as it did in the other arena in the 1930's when it
established majority control as a matter of creditor-creditor relations. This new position follows a political trend of three hundred
years of giving greater recognition to the interest of workers. It is
parallel to other modern social legislation which has included
medicare, medicaid, food stamps, social security, unemployment
insurance, and in the past has included child labor laws, minimum
wage laws and occupation health and safety laws.
The Bankruptcy Code incorporated other features beneficial
to the debtor and evolutionary in nature such as: increase in prior211. See supra note 97 and accompanying text, and text accompanying note
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ity wages,'2 12 broader personal exemptions, 1 redemptions of encumbered property2 1 ' and narrower exceptions to discharge. "' In
plans of debtors with regular income, the Code provides protection
for co-debtors and discharge from all debts except for relatively
current taxes, alimony and support.'1
The method of avoidance which the Congress has selected
takes cognizance of the Bankruptcy Rules and provides for a complaint, summons, answer, discovery hearings, a trial, evidence, or
whatever would be available for the most complicated of issues involving vast sums of money.11 7 No one, it would appear, ever has
raised an objection to the procedural method of carrying out the
legislative policy. The writer has never heard of a creditor's taking
even the first step toward protecting the lien by obtaining an appraisal of the household goods and estimating what would be the
costs of repossession and sale. To paraphrase an old simile, the
creditors are acting like a wolf in red herring's clothing. They pose
as a major constitutional question what is, in essence, a simple
matter of proof (which they know they can not sustain). In not one
of several hundred cases of this nature in which the writer has had
direct judicial involvement has a creditor ever offered proof of the
commercial value of nonpurchase-money secured household goods.
To the creditor the nonpurchaser-money household goods
have a negative value; he does not want to pick them up because of
the considerable inconvenience and expense of getting rid of them.
The creditor does not want the goods; he does not want the lien in
order to get the goods; his only interest in the goods is a realization
that they do have a value to the debtor upon which the creditor
may capitalize.
Gifford is susceptible to a line by line analysis. This is appropriate because it demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit is blazing
a new trail. The substantial and significant questions about which
that court speaks will be isolated and examined:
1. "Specifically this court would be required to determine
whether the liens avoided are compensable property rights
....

"28

If the court had remanded the case, in all

212. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3).

213. Id. § 522(d).

214. Id. § 722.
215. Id. § 523.
216. Id. § 1328(a)(2).
217. See BANKR. R. 701-782.
218. 669 F.2d at 472.
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probability the trial court would have found that the liens
had a commercial value of zero or less.
2. "[W]hether avoidance of the liens constitutes a sufficient
deprivation of the creditor's property to invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment."'" If the creditor is deprived
of property worth zero, or next to zero, where does the Constitution come into play? Radford itself speaks in terms of
"substantial." There are innumerable Supreme Court cases
advocating the de minimis principle. 2 0
3. "[W]hether substitution of an unsecured claim for the
creditor's right in specific property is sufficient compensation.' 21 The rights in the specific property have no commercial value, so that the creditor, in either event, will recover on the basis of his unsecured claim, if at all.
Furthermore, there is no substitution. Borchard and the
second Union Central case established that a secured claim
consists of two parts:
(a) the secured part which is measured by the value
of the collateral; and
(b) the unsecured part, which is the excess of the
claim over the value of the collateral."'
Because the collateral had no value, the secured creditor
only had the second part of the claim to look to from the
outset. From the standpoint of property, his position has
not changed. All that has happened is that he has lost an
ability to coerce the debtor. Under the Bankruptcy Code,
whenever there is an issue involving a security interest, it
will hinge on the value of the property because that is the
measure of the security interest-that and only that.
Before discussing the law review article by R. Greenblatt" 6 on
which Gifford relies so heavily for the issue of retroactivity, it
should be pointed out that the earlier discussion of that issue in
219. Id.
220. See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 276 (1928). See also NLRB v. Denver
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951), Commissioner v. Church,
335 U.S. 632 (1949), Spiegel v. Commissioner 335 U.S. 701 (1949) Tumey v. Ohio,
273 U.S. 510 (1926), Industrial Ass'n of San Francisco v. United States, 268 U.S.
64 (1925).
221. 669 F.2d at 472.
222. 310 U.S. 311 (1940); 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
223. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51
Nw. U.L. REv. 540 (1956).
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this article did not treat the bi-polar aspect of bankruptcy questions but dealt with the subject entirely as a matter of bankruptcy
law in the traditional sense. It is in the nature of traditional bankruptcy law for any new legislation to be retrospective because it
has to be such in order to function effectively in deciding issues
4
between creditors.2
Where the confrontation is between a debtor and a single
creditor and the outcome will not affect other creditors, there is
nothing in the nature of things that would require that the law be
prospective, retrospective or Janusian. Everything else being equal,
that a law of that type probably would be prospective is the point
of Mr. Greenblatt's article. It will be demonstrated that everything
else is not equal in the section 522(f)(2)(A) confrontations. What
might otherwise be a normal assumption does not pertain for two
principal reasons:
(1) the Bankruptcy Code as a whole is retrospective, so that
the normal presumption would be that all segments of it
would be retrospective also; and
(2) there was a strong public policy reason for having this
particular segment retrospective.
Mr. Greenblatt's article does not recognize that there are certain
kinds of laws which are inherently retrospective as a matter of economics (such as stay laws, apportionment laws, installment laws
and bankruptcy laws). The article does not deny this fact, it just
did not consider it because the focus was elsewhere. Because the
subject matter of section 522(f)(2)(A) is not one of those which
would cause the law inherently to be retrospective, the absence of
the distinction by Mr. Greenblatt is not determinative. The article
is valid where the point of friction is between a debtor and a single
224. All of the bankruptcy related statutes discussed in this article have been
Janusian with two exceptions, the act of 1747 (20 Geo. 2, ch. 52, § 23) and the act
of 1764 (4 Geo. 3, ch. 33). The first was retrospective only; the second was prospective only, and those results were a consequence of the inherent nature of
each. The act of 1747 was an amnesty measure. A nation does not grant amnesty
in advance of the commission of a crime or else the nation would not have control
over that crime in the future. The act of 1764 was one under which the members
of Parliament caused themselves to become subject to the bankruptcy process for
the first time on the basis of debts incurred subsequent to the enactment of the
law. It is not in the nature of legislators to cause themselves to become liable for
their past sins if they can satisfy public pressure by becoming answerable only for
their future sins.
Frazier-Lemke was retroactive, but it was a stay law and not a bankruptcy
law. It had nothing to do with distributions to creditors.
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creditor, as it is here, with this further qualification. The article
dealt with a one subject law. It did not consider a law which has a
large number of facets where the public policy consideration affecting one facet might be different from that affecting one or more
other facets. It may be assumed that all of the segments of the
Code which deal with a confrontation between creditors have to be
retrospective for the Code to function. It may be assumed also that
all segments which relate to the discharge of the debtor were intended to be retrospective. Thus the vast bulk of the Code clearly
was intended to be retrospective. Property issues between a debtor
and a single creditor could have been prospective, retrospective or
Janusian.
Because the bulk of the Code was retrospective by nature or
by clear implication, in the absence of an express exclusion or necessary implication, there is a presumption that the entire Code was
intended to be retrospective.
Gifford relies on Mr. Greenblatt's article to support its conclusion that section 522(f)(2)(A) should not be retroactive to which
there are several answers:
(1) Section 522(f)(2)(A) is not retroactive; it is retrospective, as are virtually all bankruptcy statutes. It does not vacate or reverse any action taken previously; it merely prevents prospective use of a security lien to force payment of
a discharged debt.
(2) Mr. Greenblatt's article does not support the proposition for which it is cited.
The thesis of Mr. Greenblatt's article is that legislation should
not be retroactive unless there is a strong interest in making it
such, but Mr. Greenblatt did not differentiate between statutes
which are retroactive and those which are retrospective.
The conclusion which Gifford posed as a double negative 2 '
can be handled more simply if stated in positive terms: "whether
the preservation of pre-enactment liens is a sufficiently strong interest . . . that the legislature would have intended to maintain

it." In looking at the legislative history one finds that even the consumer finance industry was not concerned with the continuation or
reaffirmation of nonpurchase-money security interests in household goods. (Purchase-money collateral yes; but not nonpurchase225. "[W]hether the preservation of pre-enactment liens is a sufficiently

strong interest that the legislature could not, in the absence of specific language,
have intended to destroy it. . . ." 669 F.2d at 473.
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money collateral.) The Bankruptcy Commission was so violently
opposed to continuations and reaffirmations of nonpurchasemoney security interests that it proposed to change the entire
structure of discharges by causing nonpurchase-money secured
debts to become extinguished so that reaffirmations would not be
possible.
The Congress followed the traditional discharge theory but required that reaffirmation agreements not be enforceable unless entered prior to the discharge and approved by the bankruptcy court.
There was a strong interest in a change and little or no interest in
the status quo. Under Mr. Greenblatt's formula of moving in the
direction of the strong interest, the legislation should be construed
retroactively to eliminate existing security interests in specified
consumer goods.
The dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Cummings in Gifford2 6
did go into the legislative background deeply enough to pick up
the essential causes of Congressional concern-that is, that the security had no significant worth and had been taken as collateral
not because of its inherent worth but because of its potential for
coercion.
The dissenting opinion also recognized that bankruptcy laws
are retrospective in nature, and that this law was intended to be
such by Congress. That opinion concentrated on the language of
the statute, whereas this article is devoted to showing the economic
and historical reasons for the language that was used. Each approach leads to the same destination. Neither the Seventh Circuit
majority nor the Tenth Circuit in Rodrock indicated an awareness
of the practical aspects of the question which was being addressed.
Appellate courts have no reason to be aware of common
financing practices, which are not described in the bankruptcy
court decisions on appeal but are outlined herein. There is no reason that the appellate courts should have known, for example, that
a Brookings Institution study found that forty-one percent of a
group of discharged debtors continued to be harrassed for payment
of their discharged debts.3 It is for this reason that courts should
not attempt to substitute their judgments for those of the legislatures, which have the ability and the duty to assemble data upon
which they can base public policy decisions.
226. 669 F.2d 468, 474 (Cummings, C.J., dissenting).

227. See D.
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(1971) (referred to generally as the "Brookings Report").
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CONCLUSION

As this article goes to press the Supreme Court has received
briefs in the Rodrock case, causing certain intellectual quaere:
(1) Will the Supreme Court recognize that the value of the
collateral lies at the heart of Rodrock, Gifford and all other secured
interest problems under the Bankruptcy Code, and that Rodrock
does not present genuine issues to be tried because there is no evidence of commercial value?
(2) Will the Supreme Court state flatly that the constitutional
limit of protection of a security interest is the value of the
collateral?
(3) Will the Supreme Court reemphasize the de minimis
28
2

principle?

(4) Will the Supreme Court remand to have established the
value of the collateral without making policy pronouncements?
Probably not, because among other things there is a conflict between the Tenth Circuit in Rodrock and the Third Circuit in Ashe
v. Commonwealth National Bank.2 '9

228. See supra note 221.
229. 669 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1982).

